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This article examines how the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Hollywood collaborated to manufacture the blockbuster films Transformers (T) and Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen (TRF) to sell in global markets and to sell a positive image of DoD personnel, policy, technology, and practice to the world. T and TRF are global militainment films made by the “DoD‐Hollywood complex” to make money in markets and put the U.S. military before the world in a positive light. To show how, the article's first section defines the “DoD‐Hollywood complex,” presents a brief 20th‐century history of its formation, and describes the current DoD institutions, policies, and practices that fuse DoD publicity agencies to Hollywood filmmakers. The second section highlights how DoD assisted T and TRF's production and contemplates why Hollywood solicited DoD support. The third section shows how T and TRF put DoD in a positive light. The conclusion addresses some of the consequences of T and TRF with regard to democratic theory. By showing T and TRF to be global militainment commodities, this article interrogates the nexus of “reel” and “real” U.S. military power and sheds light on how DoD interacts with Hollywood studios to influence how it gets screened by entertainment media and seen by global spectators.

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This article argues that digital war games communicate misleading stereotypes about Muslims that prop up patriarchal militarism and Islamophobia in the context of the US-led Global War on Terror. The article's first section establishes the relevance of the study of digital war games to feminist games studies, feminist international relations, and post-colonial feminism. The second section contextualizes the contemporary production and consumption of digital war games with regard to the “military-digital-games complex” and real and simulated military violence against Muslims, focusing especially on the US military deployment of digital war games to train soldiers to kill in real wars across Muslim majority countries. The third section probes “mythical Muslim” stereotypes in ten popular digital war games released between 2001 and 2012: Conflict: Desert Storm (2002), Conflict: Desert Storm 2 (2003), SOCOM U.S. Navy SEALs (2002), Full Spectrum Warrior (2004), Close Combat: First to Fight (2005), Battlefield 3 (2011), Army of Two (2008), Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (2007), Medal of Honor (2010), and Medal of Honor: Warfighter (2012). These games immerse players in patriarchal fantasies of “militarized masculinity” and place a “mythical Muslim” before their weaponized gaze to be virtually killed in the name of US and global security. The conclusion discusses the stakes of the stereotyping and othering of Muslims by digital war games, and highlights some challenges to Islamophobia in the digital games industry.

This article examines the nexus of global digital capitalism and US militarism in two popular war games: SOCOM I: Navy SEALs (SOCOM I) and SOCOM II: U.S. Navy SEALs (SOCOM II). SOCOM supports digital capitalism's economic interests and the US military's promotional goals in four related contexts. In its production context, SOCOM is 'glocalized digital militainment' that was synergistically co-produced by Sony Corporation (a media corporation, based in Tokyo, Japan), Zipper Interactive (a US game design firm based in Redmond, Washington) and US Naval Special Warfare (an elite branch of the US Navy). In its development context, SOCOM is a 'hyperreal' war game that was 'digitally designed' to simulate Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and cyborg-soldiering; it serves PS2 branding functions and US Navy SEALs promotion and recruitment functions. In its publishing/circulation context, SOCOM's marketing messages visually merge the home front and battle front and promote militarized play as hyper-masculine identity affirmation. In the context of play, SOCOM's design structures virtual cyborg-soldiering.