No abstract

In recent years, promising steps have been made in identifying, sharing and implementing good practices in dealing with (returning) Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters (FTFs). This policy brief addresses capacity-building challenges in relation to the implementation of these good practices. It aims to do so by sharing some of the insights and progress made with regard to the capacity-building efforts developed by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism-The Hague (ICCT) on the issue of FTFs in a selection of countries. The approach and outcomes of these capacity-building activities are linked to the recommendations in the Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF) The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon. Eight insights and recommendations are provided for policy makers and implementers alike, related to organisation, implementation, and monitoring of capacity-building efforts.

This article is based on a paper which was developed for the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s Foreign Terrorist Fighters (ftf) Working Group. It takes stock of the current trends and dynamics related to the ftf phenomenon and identifies some of the gaps that still need to be addressed. The distinction between home-grown terrorists and (returning) ftfs is fading, the difference between isil/Da’esh inspired or directed terrorist attacks is becoming more fluid and the nexus between terrorism and crime is more prominent, which clearly indicates that terrorism can manifest itself in many different ways. The involvement of returning ftfs in some terrorist attacks is a stark reminder of the potential threat returning ftfs pose. The data also indicates a demographic change with a more prominent role of female ftfs and children being recruited and used in hostilities or involved in terrorist attacks. The current trends underline the need for a comprehensive, tailored and multidisciplinary approach including the involvement of stakeholders at the local level to adequately address the evolving aspects of the ftf phenomenon. This paper provides a short overview of policy responses which can broadly be grouped into preventive, criminal, administrative and rehabilitative measures. The ftf related responses could have several human rights implications and states are encouraged to develop a comprehensive approach to address the ftf phenomenon in full respect of human rights.

After the 9/11 attacks, a united global community entered an era which saw the proliferation of United Nations entities and organs focused on responding to terrorism. These bodies were created, at least in part, in response to the recognized need for a comprehensive multilateral counter-terrorism architecture to ensure international peace and security in the face of the growing specter of violent extremism. This response has notably also included an array of UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) adopted to counter the threat of terrorism. A little over 20 years after the adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001), 52 terrorism related resolutions now exist, creating an elaborate set of measures for Member States to implement. Despite this, however, terrorism was arguably more prevalent in 2021 than in 2001. A myriad of factors have led to the continued spread of terrorism, including the increasingly transnational nature of terrorists and terrorist networks, as well as the failure to adequately address the structural factors and underlying conditions that are conducive to the spread of violent extremism. In order to explain its persistence, one must not only examine the continued appeal of terrorist groups and violent extremist ideology and propaganda, but also reflect upon where, how, and why counter-terrorism responses have often failed to reduce the threat or, in some cases, even exacerbated the factors which give rise to terrorism in the first place. This includes the response of the Security Council, whose resolutions have created the obligation or expectation for Member States to continuously expand the criminalization of terrorism, without evidence that such an approach will lead to less terrorism. This brief focuses on how some UNSCRs include measures that require Member States to criminalize conduct that has historically fallen within the pre-crime space and lacks a clear link to terrorist activities, and examines the subsequent impact this has on human rights and the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. At the same time, it explores the role that States themselves have played in the exceptionalization of terrorism in terms of criminal justice responses. Finally, it offers recommendations for both the UNSC and Members States on how to ensure that counter-terrorism architecture can both be human-rights based and simultaneously conducive to promoting peace and security.

Following the announcement of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban quickly seized control of the country. The seemingly rushed and chaotic nature of the US’ withdrawal also allowed the Taliban to seize large quantities of small arms and light weapons (SALW) left behind. This policy brief explores the purposes for which the Taliban use these newly acquired ‘spoils of war’, ranging from fighting rival group ISK-P and controlling territory to financing their activities and propaganda purposes. It finally provides recommendations on how to contain the flow of SALW in and out of Afghanistan, and draw lessons on how to better manage future withdrawal of international troops in other countries.