Contract energy management model is a new energy saving mode based on single market mechanism. Due to its externality, the energy efficiency market cannot realize the optimal allocation of resources. Government energy-saving subsidy can solve the market failure of energy-saving service market and improve the performance level of energy-saving services company. However, due to the unbalanced support fields and single incentive tools in the government incentive policy, the incentive effect of the government subsidy policies for contract energy management projects is not satisfactory. Based on a two-stage dynamic decision-making model, this article analyzes the impact of different forms of government subsidy policies on the performance level decision-making of Energy Service Company, and draws the following conclusions. (1) The effect of the government's variable subsidy policy with payment conditions is better than the fixed subsidy policy without payment conditions. (2) Government incentive policy for contract energy management needs to be directed against different energy saving fields. (3) The government should adopt different forms of incentive policies for energy saving service companies with different energy saving levels in the same energy saving field. (4) When the government implements the variable subsidy policy with preset energy saving target, each within a reasonable range, with the increase of which, the incentive effect on energy saving service companies with lower energy saving level decreases. When the subsidy policy has no incentive effect, it is more unfavorable for the energy saving service companies which are below the average level of the industry.

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Public–private partnership (PPP) projects have been widely applied in infrastructure construction. Leveraging private capital is the key to promoting the high-quality development of PPP projects. This study examines the combined effect of seven factors determining private enterprises that participate in PPP and collects materials from 102 PPP sewage treatment projects to examine the causal configuration path of private enterprises participating in PPP (PEP3P) from an overall perspective by using necessary condition analysis (NCA) and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). The findings support the fact that any single antecedent condition is not a necessary condition for PEP3P and is instead the combined effect of different factors that commonly form the diversified causal configuration paths of PEP3P. There is an obvious asymmetry between the configuration paths of the high participation and low participation of private enterprises. The enterprise technology level (ETL) and doing business (DB) are important internal driving forces and give external traction for PEP3P, while the enterprise credit level (ECL) and project investment scale (PIS) are important factors that restrict private enterprises from participating in PPP. This research fills a theoretical gap for PEP3P and can be applied to developing strategies for attracting private enterprises to participate in PPP.