No abstract

The EEA EFTA States are the only non-EU States that have been allowed, on a regular basis, to participate in the work of EU agencies governing the internal market. Participation in the work of an agency does not include the right to vote, nor are third States automatically bound by decisions enacted by the agency. Participation “in the work” of an EU agency is a way of providing decision-shaping rights in exchange to third countries that are willing to enter into mechanisms that grant the binding effect of agency decisions in their territories. As these mechanisms are intertwined with the attribution of decision-shaping rights, the arrangements for participation in the work of an EU agency become highly complex. The paper identifies and examines four different models for participation. It argues that the direct participation of third countries in EU agencies, with voting rights, would be favourable compared to the current approach.

No abstract

No abstract

er førsteamanuensis ved Senter for europarett, Nordisk institutt for sjørett. Artikkelen er en del av prosjektet «Europe in transition -Small states and Europe in an age of global shifts» (EUNOR), finansiert av Norges forskningsråd. E-post: tarjei.bekkedal@jus.uio.no. SAMMENDRAG Effektivt internasjonalt samarbeid kan fordre at Norge overfører lovgivende, utøvende eller dømmende myndighet til internasjonale organer -for eksempel til internasjonale handelsdomstoler eller til EUs forvaltningsbyråer. I sin praksis antar Justisdepartementets lovavdeling at grunnloven forutsetter at myndighet med direkte virkning i Norge skal utøves av norske organer. Artikkelen hevder at en slik tilnaerming er for restriktiv. Stortinget kan delegere myndighet gjennom alminnelig lovvedtak, jf. grunnloven § 75. Det som må begrunnes, er ikke adgangen til å fatte slikt lovvedtak, men eventuelle begrensninger. Artikkelen analyserer de relevante skrankene -selvstendighetskravet i grunnloven § 1, medlemskapsprinsippet i grunnloven § 115 og grunnlovens respektive bestemmelser om lovgivende, utøvende og dømmende myndighet. Analysen viser at handlingsrommet for myndighetsoverføring er større enn antatt i dagens praksis.STIKKORD Grunnloven, EU, EØS, myndighetsoverføring, suverenitet SUMMARY The paper discusses the transfer of lawmaking, administrative or judicial power to international organizations and institutions. The current doctrine presupposes that the Norwegian constitution requires such competences to be executed solely by Norwegian bodies. To the opposite, the paper argues that the sovereign power of the Norwegian Parliament to enact any law includes the admission to enact laws which entail a transfer of powers to international bodies. It is not the competence of the Norwegian Parliament to enact laws which transfer powers that has to be established, but the limitations of that competence.