Transparency, one of the fundamental norms of the trading system, is increasingly seen as an essential tool in the governance of international trade. Enhanced monitoring and surveillance of emergency measures was central to the international effort to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis that began in 2008. This paper develops a new analytic framework for thinking about WTO transparency provisions. We apply this framework to a detailed case study of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and then compare this experience to other domains within the WTO. We show that the WTO's windows on the trading system are cloudier than they ought to be. We conclude with some recommendations for improving WTO transparency tools. * Email: robert.wolfe@queensu.ca An earlier version of this paper was presented to the WTO Public Forum in Geneva on 25 September 2008. We have learned a great deal from confidential interviews with Canadian officials, none of whom is responsible for our remaining mistakes. Jonathan Preece provided exemplary research assistance, cheerfully reading WTO committee minutes beyond the expected limits of human endurance. We are grateful for the suggestions of Rolf Adlung,

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This paper explores the implications of recent developments in firm‐based trade theory and empirics for trade policy and negotiations. While traditional trade theory focused on the country, and the new trade theory of the 1980s adopted the industry as the unit for analysis, the newest theory emphasizes the role of firms and firm heterogeneity in international trade. We describe insights from this reformulation of theory and the empirical literature that illuminates it. The realities of trade as now understood show the need for a new new trade policy. Evaluating trade at the level of the firm implies that overcoming firm‐level fixed costs of trade and reducing uncertainty lead to increased trade along margins that generate the highest productivity, innovation and welfare gains. The traditional market access agenda ought now to be less important on the multilateral agenda than services, standards, trade facilitation, procurement and innovation policy. The analytical needs of a new new trade policy require new models and more access to firm‐level data to formulate and evaluate the multifaceted impacts of trade policy.