It has become common practice to refer to personality traits as being either bright or dark, and a wealth of research has provided support for the effects of both bright traits and dark traits in organizations. This research has largely focused on explaining the downside of dark traits and the upside of bright traits. However, a recent trend has emerged in which scholars are challenging the long-standing convention that bright traits are always beneficial and dark traits are always detrimental. Instead, novel research has begun to explore the potential upside of dark traits and downside of bright traits. In this review, we adopt a multidomain perspective—integrating work from organizational behavior, human resources, strategic management, and entrepreneurship—to highlight this growing body of research. Specifically, we focus on the work advancing our understanding of the complexity of personality, such as identifying situations in which dark traits may be advantageous or beneficial and detecting curvilinear effects that suggest too much of a bright trait may be disadvantageous. Furthermore, we provide a brief discussion on special considerations for the measurement of both bright and dark traits and close with a series of avenues for future research.

Research Summary In this study, we investigate the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) humility on firm's market performance. We argue and find that firms with more humble CEOs will have better market performance but not because they actually perform better but, rather, because they benefit from an expectation discount in the market. Specifically, we show that, all else equal, financial analysts announce lower earnings per share expectations for firms with more humble CEOs. This expectation discount sets the stage for those firms to meet or beat analysts' expectations resulting in improved market performance for firms with humble CEOs. We find support for our ideas with a sample of Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 CEOs, operationalizing CEO humility with a videometric technique. Managerial Summary In this study, we investigate the effect of CEO humility on firm's market performance. We show that firms with more humble CEOs will outperform other firms in the market because financial analysts tend to set lower market expectations for firms with more humble CEOs increasing the probability that they will outperform those expectations. Rather counterintuitively, these firms do not have better market performance because they perform better but because they face lower expectations. Ultimately, the study demonstrates the importance of CEO characteristics for external evaluations and perceptions about the firm with significant effects on investment performance.

Research Summary: Integrating victimization into competitive dynamics and upper echelons theorizing, we develop and test theory articulating how rivals' perceptions of a CEO precipitate attacks on the CEO's firm. Rather than treating CEOs' characteristics solely as perpetrating action (a first-order effect, like research integrating upper echelons into competitive dynamics), we argue firms with CEOs possessing characteristics perceived as more submissive or more provocative are subject to more competitive actions directed toward their firms (a secondorder effect, like victimization research). Empirical analyses of a sample of Fortune 500 CEOs supports our theorizing while interviews of executives corroborate our premise as well. Our framework offers a more complete and socialized understanding of CEOs' roles in competitive dynamics, providing both theoretical and practical insights as well as future research avenues. Managerial Summary: We articulate how CEOs possessing certain psychological, behavioral, and social characteristics may unknowingly precipitate competitive attacks on their firms. Our explanation integrates insights from victimology which explain how individuals are subject to more attacks if they possess characteristics others perceive as more submissive or more provocative. While prior research articulates that CEOs' characteristics affect decisions such as attacking rivals, integrating theories of victimization into this line of inquiry paints a more socialized view of why firms may be subject to competitive attacks as well. The logic and evidence we provide advances theoretical explanations of firms' competitive behaviors and executives' roles therein. At the same time, providing knowledge about how CEO characteristics precipitate

This study builds on insights from the upper echelons tradition in strategy to examine the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) Machiavellianism on relevant firm costs. While Machiavellianism has

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