Soluble silicon has been reported to suppress some plant diseases, but in vitro inhibition of phytopathogenic fungi has not been demonstrated. In the current study in-vitro dose-responses towards soluble potassium silicate (20.7% Si0 2 ) were determined for Phytophthora cinnamomi, Sc/erotinia sc/erotiorum, , pythium F-group, Mucor pusi/lus, Drechs/era sp, Fusarium oxysporum, F. so/ani, A/temaria so/ani, Col/etotrichum coccodes, Verticil/ium theobromae, Curvu/aria lunata and Stemphylium herbarum. Inhibition of mycelial growth was doserelated with 100% inhibition at 80 ml (pH 11.7) and 40 ml (pH 11.5) soluble potassium silicate per litre of agar, for all fungi tested with the exception of Drechs/era sp. and F. oxysporum at 40 ml in one experiment. Only Sc/erotinia sc/erotiorum and Phytophthora cinnamomiwere completely inhibited at all soluble potassium silicate concentrations between 5 and 80 ml.r1 agar, while all the other fungi were only partially inhibited at potassium silicate concentrations of 5, 10 and 20 ml.r 1 agar. Percentage inhibition was positively correlated with dosage. Soluble potassium silicate raised the pH of unameliorated agar from 5.6 to 10.3 and 11.7 at potassium silicate concentrations of 5 and 80 ml.r 1 agar respectively. Subsequent investigations into the effect of pH in the absence of potassium silicate showed that fungal growth was only partially inhibited at pH 10.3 and 11.7. Clearly, potassium silicate had an inhibitory effect on fungal growth in vitro and this was mostly fungicidal rather than attributed to a pH effect.

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The summary judgment procedure in South African law provides for a speedy judgment in favour of a deserving plaintiff where it can be shown that the defendant does not have a triable defence. In 2019 the Rules Board made certain drastic amendments to the procedure of summary judgment in the high court. In this article the historical development of the procedure of summary judgment will be discussed, and the new amendments to rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court critically evaluated. It will be argued that the amendments to rule 32 were unnecessary and that it may diminish the right to access to justice in civil disputes. It will, however, also be argued that there are some merits in the critique raised by the Rules Board in relation to rule 32 and that the Rules Board missed a golden opportunity to overhaul the entire summary judgment procedure in a more sensible manner and in line with the core constitutional values of s 34 of the Constitution. It will be argued that rule 32 should be replaced in its entirety by a new, more streamlined procedure, and some recommendations for legal reform will be made in this regard.

Section 34 of the Constitution encapsulates the ideal of access to justice in civil matters, and provides that everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law, decided in a fair public hearing before a Court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. This includes the requirement that the duration and costs of civil litigation should be reasonable. Unfortunately this objective is sometimes defeated by unnecessary and costly delays, due to tactical and careless postponements of civil matters in both the high and magistrates’ courts. One of the main culprits in this regard is the procedure of the amendment of pleadings after a trial has commenced. Our courts have always followed a very liberal approach in this regard in that an application for amendment will usually succeed, unless it is made mala fide or will lead to prejudice to the opponent, which cannot be cured by a cost order and, where appropriate, a postponement. In Randa v Radopile Projects CC (2012 (6) SA 128 (GSJ)), Willis J advocated a new approach in deciding of whether an application for an amendment should be granted. This approach is also in line with the latest developments in England, where the Courts recently favoured a more conservative approach in relation to applications for amendments at a late stage. This case note will firstly focus on a brief discussion of the historical development of the Court’s discretion in allowing amendments to pleadings. Secondly, the decision in Randa will be critically analysed. Thirdly, the latest developments in the English law will be discussed, and, lastly, some alternatives will be considered for legal reform. It will be argued that the Supreme Court of Appeal should alter its approach to the late amendment of pleadings in favour of a more conservative approach, as evidenced by the current English approach, alternatively that the legislature should intervene to capture the scope and ambit of a Court’s discretion in deciding whether an application for the amendment of a pleading after the commencement of a trial, should succeed.