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This chapter situates Guba and Lincoln's chapter within the broad philosophical debate about the justifiability of interpretations.The emergence of a new paradigm of inquiry (naturalistic) has, unsurprisingly enough, led to a demand for rigorous criteria that meet traditional standards of inquiry. Two sets are suggested, one of which, the “trustworthiness” criteria, parallels conventional criteria, while the second, “ authenticity” criteria, is implied directly by new paradigm assumptions.

Criteriology is the quest for permanent or stable criteria of rationality founded in the desire for objectivism and the belief that we must somehow transcend the limitations to knowing that are the inevitable consequence of our sociotemporal perspective as knowers. The project of criteriology has, in turn, shaped our way of thinking about the epistemology of social inquiry. This article offers a way of redefining social inquiry without recourse to criteriology. It presents a view of social inquiry as practical philosophy and discusses the vision that enables that practice, the conditions that sustain that practice, and the place of such a practice in society.

There is a strong tendency for evidence-based approaches to social practices to view these practices as imperfect devices for delivering social services. Practices are regarded as in need of repair by evaluation (and research) that can deliver the necessary science-based solution to the problems of practice. This article presents a different view of practices as material and linguistic events in which activities and relationships are constituted and unfold in interaction and in which people change and develop, and it argues for restoring this view of practice to evaluation. The article discusses two different ways in which notions of evidence based, practice, and evaluation are related and suggests what a genuinely practice-oriented approach to evaluation entails.

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