This article compares the United States’ and China's international efforts of responding to the current coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and considers how the global public is receiving both to project how such measures would likely shape the international leadership competition. How do the international efforts of the United States and China on COVID-19 affect their respective soft power? How does the global public perception of the United States' and China's COVID-19 efforts affect their competitive advantage for global leadership? Based on the theory of soft power, I use Europe and Africa as cases with global perception data from the Pew Research Center (2017–2020) to argue that China would likely win some admiration for its COVID-19 efforts. However, it is unlikely to substantially shape positive global public perception of China to gain a competitive edge over the United States. This argument is based on the narrative China presents in the pandemic, its diplomatic style, and the ideational attachment the U.S. style has established. I utilize a phenomenological approach with narrative analysis.

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Security discussions of the Taliban’s second takeover of Afghanistan center on physical security threats, neglecting the ontological aspect related to how security entails the metaphysics of life—being, feeling alive, or having a sense of self. This article examines this ontological threat to the Afghan people to complement the security discussion and open up more avenues of dialog. I use ontological security to explain the Afghans’ behavior toward the Taliban takeover and ask how does the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan pose a security threat to urban Afghans? Why are urbanite Afghans paranoiac about the Taliban presence to the extent that some choose to die by falling from a moving aircraft? I use the ontological security analytical framework and discursive approach to finding answers. I argue that the Taliban takeover creates ontological insecurity that threatens urban Afghans’ sense of ordinary living or being in the world. Specifically, ontological insecurity creates significant and chronic uncertainties and dangers to Afghans. This is especially so regarding the urbanites with higher socioeconomic status, whose being in the world is threatened as their ordinary living conditions are likely to be contested by the Taliban. The contest is asymmetric, favoring the Taliban. Such uncertainty of existential conditions leads to mistrust of Urban Afghans’ basic sense of safety and a misrecognition of their true identity. Thus, their actions and behaviors have been consequent attempts to respond to the anxieties and risks to their existential position. This work contributes to the ontological security literature, helping fill the gap in the security discussions in international relations and serves policy relevance.

This article uses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to examine the asymmetric relationship between China and Kazakhstan under a proposed framework—symmetric interest. It breaks from the domination–submission, divergent stakes, interests, patterns, and misperception perspectives characterizing asymmetry to show how asymmetric relations in a non-external security context elucidate peaceful relations. Under what conditions do asymmetric relationships defy misperception and confrontation to produce peaceful cooperation? How is the BRI likely to manage China's asymmetric relationship with Kazakhstan? The study argues that asymmetric relations within domestic security and other non-external military security issue areas engender peaceful cooperation. This peaceful cooperation emerges because the stakes and interests of the parties become more symmetrical in absolute terms; thus managing misperceptions and associated confrontation. We propose a framework of symmetric interest and employ the cases of China and Kazakhstan to test the hypotheses and support the conclusion. Beyond providing an alternative perspective in the asymmetry literature, we lastly offer a discussion of the policy relevance.

China's economic growth and related assertiveness are causing significant changes in the Asia Pacific strategic environment, producing policy responses from the region's major powers, and gaining linkage with 1914 Europe. This article revisits the analogy, made in 2014, between the Asia Pacific today and Europe of 1914 to theoretically explain Asia Pacific's strategic environment vis-à-vis China's rise and the responses of four Asia Pacific powers—the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. Using the notion of “security dilemma,” I argue that a perceived threat of China's newfound confidence expressed in military aggressions creates distrust, fear, and uncertainty in the Asia Pacific, resembling Germany and its ambitions in the first half of twentieth century Europe. However, the similarity does not necessarily mean that the two environments and periods would produce similar outcomes because the strategic conditions are different. Asia Pacific today is more constrained in alliances than twentieth century Europe. I conclude by critiquing the balance of power to propose a power-sharing mechanism in the region to ensure peace.