If downward nominal wage rigidity exists, it should affect the distribution of earnings changes. We present a common analytical framework for three distinct and previously unconnected approaches to the analysis of downward nominal rigidity, the skewness-location approach, the symmetry approach and the histogram-location approach. We modify them by dropping the assumption of time-invariant rigidity and apply them to earnings data from the IAB-Beschftigtenstichprobe (IABS). We find that the distribution of West German log earnings changes is indeed affected by downward nominal rigidity. Our modification of the approaches also allows us to find that the degree of nominal rigidity depends on business cycle conditions, with weaker rigidity in times of rising unemployment. Our findings support the critics of very low inflation targets. Copyright Verein fü Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001.

This paper substantially extends the limited available evidence on existence and extent of downward nominal wage rigidity in the European Union and the Euro Area. For this purpose we develop an econometric multi-country model based on Kahn's (1997) histogram-location approach and apply it to employee micro data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for twelve of the EU's current member states. Our estimates for the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity on the national as well as the EU-wide level point to marked downward nominal wage rigidity within the European Union.

Many recent attempts to find evidence on downward nominal wage rigidity in micro data have suffered from problems such as composition bias and the effects of measurement error. In this paper, a model of proportional downward nominal wage rigidity is developed which avoids these problems by taking into account the determinants of wage changes and the measurement process that leads to observable earnings changes. We find a high degree of downward nominal wage rigidity in German micro data. Its real implications for individual expected wage growth, the aggregate wage level and equilibrium unemployment have marked effects for rates of inflation lower than 3 percent.

In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into account and compare our findings for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under other unemployment compensation schemes. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape and position of the wage-setting curve depends on the specification of the unemployment benefit system. We also demonstrate that a reduction of unemployment benefits of those who become unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium unemployment.