Referendums impose considerable informational demands on voters. Recent theoretical and empirical research has emphasized the different shortcuts and heuristics they may employ in deciding how to vote. Relying on a substantial series of votes at the national level in Switzerland, we provide empirical tests on how Swiss voters cope with the informational demands in referendum voting. We combine simple heuristics, like partisan cues and endorsements, with indicators of instrumental interests to explain citizens' choices in a series of votes

A B S T R A C TThis article aims to explain attitudes towards the European Union in Central and East European countries. I propose a model that combines economic and political variables at two levels of explanation: the individual and the national. Using a cross-sectional time series data set compiled from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer surveys, I demonstrate that individual attitudes towards domestic economic and political reforms are good predictors of citizens' attitudes towards the European Union in Central and East European countries. Macro dimensions, such as economic and political performance, have an impact on attitudes towards the EU, particularly in candidate countries. Finally, a multiplicative model with interaction effects between the individual level and the macro level suggests that attitudes have a stronger impact if the domestic conditions are good. If the country is in bad shape, the attitudes are less relevant.

In the literature on civil conflicts federalism is often touted as a useful institution to address regional demands. Diversity in the groups present in a country is associated, however, also with a higher tendency for conflicts. In this paper we examine how the geographic distribution of groups across a country affects the ways in which federalism contributes to conflict resolution. Of tantamount importance in assessing these effects of federalism is whether particular types of distributions of groups across a territory makes the adoption of federal institutions more likely.

A simple game-theoretic model suggests that voter preferences should find stronger reflection in policy outcomes if referendums are possible than if such popular influence is excluded. Relying on the large-scale quasiexperiment of European integration, we test whether referendums lead to more supportive voters with data covering more than 20 years. We find suggestive evidence for our theoretical implication that constitutional provisions for referendums lead to citizens more supportive of European integration. Similarly, the results suggest that voters more strongly support European integration immediately after a referendum vote.