Literature on private regulation recognizes the proliferation of competing regulatory organizations and approaches in various industries. Studies analyzing why fragmentation arises so far focus on single-case studies, the exploration of single variables, or variation in types of fragmentation. This article analyzes why in certain industries and for certain issues regulatory organizations proliferate, while in others a single regulatory organization emerges which covers the entire industry. Through a comparative case study of private regulation of sustainability standards in the forestry, clothing, IT-electronics, and chemicals industries, we show how a combination of low industrial concentration, civil society involvement in governance, and stringent standards of a first-moving regulator offer the strongest explanation for a fragmented private regulatory field, while high industrial concentration, business-driven governance, and lenient standards of a first-moving regulator lead to cohesive regulation.

During the past few years, the European Union (EU) has made increasing use of the so-called soft modes of governance (SMG), modes based on voluntary and non-sanctioning forms of public action, where state and non-state actors interact in extensive networks to solve complex social problems. This article deals with the issue of the democratic credentials of soft modes of governance at the EU level. Starting by recognizing that they entail an authoritative allocation of values that have a wide societal reach, the article argues that a careful examination of the democratic legitimacy of these soft modes of governance needs to take into account their diverse nature. By pointing out different theoretical concepts of democracy, the article elaborates an analytical framework based on a series of yardsticks for the assessment of the democratic legitimacy of SMGs in the EU, thus providing a much-needed conceptual clarification for a research agenda that is ultimately an empirical one.

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This article conducts a comparative analysis of peer and public pressure in peer reviews among states. Arguing that such pressure is one increasingly important form of shaming in global politics, we seek to understand the extent to which five different peer reviews exert peer and public pressure and how possible variation among them can be explained. Our findings are based on responses to an original survey and semi-structured interviews among participants in the reviews. We find that peer and public pressure exist to different degrees in the peer reviews under study. Such differences cannot be explained by the policy area under review or the international organization in which peer reviews are organized. Likewise, the expertise of the actors involved in a peer review or perceptions of the legitimacy of peer review as a monitoring instrument do not explain the variation. Instead, we find that institutional factors and the acceptance of peer and public pressure among the participants in a peer review offer the best explanations.

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