A violent extremist group poses a significant threat to parts of Cabo Delgado province. Since its first major attack in October 2017, it has perpetuated a conflict to the detriment of sections of the population and government, as well as disrupting economic development. Little is known about the group and there is a considerable amount of confusion in policymaking and academic circles about the nature of the violent extremists (VE) and their relationship to the wider global Salafi-Jihadi community. By analysing the theological underpinnings of VE and their action in Cabo Delgado (CD), we bring clarity to this debate to enable international actors and policymakers in Mozambique navigate the complexities of the situation. From this analysis we conclude the following: VE are not Salafi-Jihadis as they do not share their ideological and theological understanding of the world. It is more accurate to present VE as challengers to the established order. Their struggle is best understood as a challenge to authorities to secure increased political and religious representation, and socio-economic benefits in CD.

The case of Robert Gordon-Canning highlights the crucial role of culture, both national and institutional, on the development of doctrine by the British Union of Fascists in the interwar period. This article aims to explore in depth the career of Gordon-Canning and present the cultural factors that pushed him to adopt apocalyptic visions of war. These visions of war became the mainstay of foreign and defence polices of the BUF, due to Gordon-Canning's influential position within the movement. KEYWORDS British Army; interwar; fascism; British Union of Fascists; doctrine 'War has been the main pivot of religion, politics and economics and, unless this undoubted fact is recognised, religion, politics and economics cannot be correctly understood.' 1 These were the words of John Frederick Charles Fuller, in a letter to his friend Basil Liddell Hart in 1927. The idea that war, politics, religion and economics were intertwined and developing in symbiosis was a by-product of the totalisation of war that took place from 1914-1918, when entire nations expounded all national forces in the pursuit of victory. In this article, I will attempt to reverse Fuller's theorem to show that, in the interwar period, one cannot understand the changing nature of war without understanding the momentous socio-politico-cultural transformations of the time. To this end, I will highlight the role of culturesnational, institutional and sub-institutionalto the development of visions of future war by military theorists in Britain, the majority of which were either fascists or quasi-fascists.