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Povzetek Aktualna osredotočenost na hibridne grožnje in asimetrično bojevanje se morda zdi komaj kaj več kot le vrnitev v preteklost. Kako daleč v preteklost pa je treba iti, da prepoznamo resnico? Številne doktrine in teorije iz industrijske dobe danes več ne veljajo. Treba se je bolj usmeriti k algoritmu kot vodilu za ukrepanje in ne ostati pri statični paradigmi. Združena interakcija civilnega in vojaškega področja je ena izmed možnosti, ki omogoča odprto varnostno kodo za združevanje strokovnjakov in strokovnega znanja na zahtevo ter ob pravem času. Treba je torej združiti prizadevanja in izboljšati mednarodne mehanizme kriznega upravljanja, da bi zagotovili hitrejši, natančnejši in učinkovitejši odziv. Geografija ne zagotavlja več varnosti. V krizi ni pomembno, iz katere smeri prihaja grožnja. Vsi smo v istem čolnu ali na vesoljski ladji Zemlja. Ključne besede Asimetrično bojevanje, vojaške doktrine, hibridne grožnje, interakcija civilnega in vojaškega področja, odpornost, solidarnost, končno stanje, način razmišljanja. Abstract The current focus on hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare can seem little more than a return to the past. How far into the past should we go to recognize this truth? Many doctrines and theories from the Industrial Age are not valid today. We need to move closer to the algorithm as a guide to action rather than remaining stuck using a static paradigm. Joint Civil-Military Interaction is one option offering an open security code, combining experts and expertise on demand and on time. We must unite our efforts, and improve international mechanisms of crisis management to respond faster, more accurately, and more efficiently. Geography no longer provides security. In a crisis, it does not matter from which direction the threat comes. We are all in the same boat or on Spaceship Earth. Key words Asymmetric warfare, military doctrines, hybrid threats, civil-military interaction, resilience, solidarity, end state, way of thinking.

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Despite the third party efforts of the significant international and regional organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, the Upper Karabakh problem remains unresolved for over 20 years. Neither the four resolutions related to Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijani lands adopted by the UN SC in the early 1990s have worked, nor the formal negotiations over this conflict that have taken place under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group for more than 20 years have reached any tangible results. These facts give rise to questions about effectiveness of the role of this institution in reaching a resolution to the conflict. The ceasefire regime is in effect since May 1994 without changing the situation, in which Armenia still keeps about 20 percent of Azerbaijani lands under invasion and is effectively involved in building a new state over the invaded lands. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of UN resolutions in liberating Azerbaijan’s invaded regions, both within and outside of Upper Karabakh, as well as the OSCE mediation efforts to resolve this conflict. It also discusses effectiveness of the negotiation process, and raises a question about impartiality of the mediators and usefulness of the mediation institution of the OSCE in general. It argues that the OSCE Minsk Group has failed to successfully establish and lead the process of negotiations, thus expecting a fruitful yield is not realistic.