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Abstract.  Empirical evidence of the impact of borders on international trade flows using the gravity equation approach abounds. This paper examines the empirical relevance of state borders in U.S. interstate trade for various specifications of the gravity equation. We find a large and economically significant subnational border effect for some specifications. However, two model specifications drastically reduce (if not eliminate) the border effect: (i) dynamic panel specifications controlling for past levels of trade and (ii) models conditioning on internal migration.

Do contributions levels matter for endogenous protection or is the existence of a lobby sufficient? Are lobbies' net benefits from protection identical to their contribution levels, or does the level of protection simply reflect contribution levels of supporters and opponents? We estimate the Influence Driven (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and the Tariff Function (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982) models within a unified theoretical framework to examine the contrasting implications derived from these two prominent tariff formation models.We find strong evidence that protection is indeed "for sale." The important new result is, however, that not only the existence of lobbies matters, but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions. Using J tests to compare the power of the models directly, we cannot reject the null of correct specification of the Influence Driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the Tariff Function model.

Do contributions levels matter for endogenous protection or is the existence of a lobby sufficient? Are lobbies' net benefits from protection identical to their contribution levels, or does the level of protection simply reflect contribution levels of supporters and opponents? We estimate the Influence Driven (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and the Tariff Function (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982) models within a unified theoretical framework to examine the contrasting implications derived from these two prominent tariff formation models. We find strong evidence that protection is indeed "for sale." The important new result is, however, that not only the existence of lobbies matters, but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions. Using J tests to compare the power of the models directly, we cannot reject the null of correct specification of the Influence Driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the Tariff Function model.

JEL Classification: F11, F17Key Words: Exchange-rate variability, exports, Latin American countries, cointegration, error-correction model Abstract This paper investigates empirically the impact of real exchange-rate volatility on the export flows of eight Latin American countries over the quarterly period . Estimates of the cointegrating relations are obtained using different cointegration techniques. Estimates of the short-run dynamics are obtained for each country utilizing the error-correction technique. The major results show that increases in the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, approximating exchange-rate uncertainty, exert a significant negative effect upon export demand in both the short-run and the long-run in each of the eight Latin American countries. These effects may result in significant reallocation of resources by market participants.