Despite similarities between tumor-initiating cells with stem-like properties (TICs) and normal neural stem cells, we hypothesized that there may be differences in their differentiation potentials. We now demonstrate that both bone morphogenetic protein (BMP)-mediated and ciliary neurotrophic factor (CNTF)-mediated Jak/STAT-dependent astroglial differentiation is impaired due to EZH2-dependent epigenetic silencing of BMP receptor 1B (BMPR1B) in a subset of glioblastoma TICs. Forced expression of BMPR1B either by transgene expression or demethylation of the promoter restores their differentiation capabilities and induces loss of their tumorigenicity. We propose that deregulation of the BMP developmental pathway in a subset of glioblastoma TICs contributes to their tumorigenicity both by desensitizing TICs to normal differentiation cues and by converting otherwise cytostatic signals to proproliferative signals.

An influential line of argument holds that trade exposure causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory and risk-sharing welfare state spending. The argument has gained renewed prominence through the recent work of Garrett (1998) and Rodrik (1997;1998). This paper argues that the relationship between trade openness and welfare state expansion is spurious, and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization. Based on cross-sectional time-series data for 15 OECD countries we show that there is no relationship between trade exposure and the level of labor market risks (in terms of employment and wages), whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for compensating welfare state policies. Yet, while differential rates of deindustrialization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state, its particular character --in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments --is shaped by government partisanship. The argument has implications for the study, and the future, of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the trade openness literature.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. To understand how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important to explain both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional incentives of governments to respond to these preferences. This paper attempts to do both, using a general theoretical framework and detailed data at both the individual and national levels. In a first step, we focus on how risk exposure and income are related to preferences for redistribution. To test our hypotheses, we extract detailed risk exposure measures from labor force surveys and marry them to cross-national survey data. In a second step, we turn our attention to the supply side of government redistribution. Terms of use: Documents in