The legal implementation of internationally agreed norms on a domestic level gives momentum to a substantial reinterpretation. Based on this insight, this article develops an ideal-typology of possible 'localization' outcomes. Apart from a literal adoption of an international norm, we show that the domestic implementation may change its emphasis (accentuation), amend it by supplementary purposes (addition), or imply a deviation which nevertheless sticks to the letter of the international wording (subversion). We argue that the specific form of localization depends on the interaction between international pressure politics and its congruence with the prevailing domestic public and private preferences. International power constellations explain why an international norm is implemented, but the specific character of its localization is mainly determined by domestic actor constellations. To substantiate our claims, we analyze the implementation of two interconnected international agreements in India and Brazil. While both the Convention on Biodiversity and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights introduce the norm of property rights for intellectual knowledge in previously (at least internationally) unregulated fields, the particular characteristics of their respective implementation in both countries display the interaction between international pressure and domestic preferences in our four case studies.

While both India and Brazil are seriously affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, each country has chosen a different approach to providing affordable pharmaceutical treatment. Whereas the Indian government has paved the way for market-driven solutions, Brazilian public authorities are strongly involved in the research and production of HIV/AIDS medication. Brazilian regulations permit comprehensive and free provision of HIV/AIDS drugs, whereas the majority of the affected population in India does not receive adequate pharmaceutical treatment. To explain the different policy outputs, we draw on the developmental state literature. Efficient decisionmaking structures, a devoted bureaucracy, and effective policy instruments enable public authorities to provide public goods even in the context of relative scarcity. We show that the assumptions of developmental state theory have to be complemented by the assessment of civil society actors' potential to trigger governmental interventions in the market.

International biodiversity politics is traced from the Brundtland Report (1987) to the Paris climate agreement of 2015. While continuously expanding in scope, international biodiversity regulations are gradually losing substance and tend to relinquish the self-determination rights of indigenous peoples with regard to natural resources. The simultaneity of expansion and erosion is surprising in view of the increased participation of indigenous spokespersons at international meetings. These dynamics are explained by the introduction of intellectual property rights for biological resources. The commodification of life forms has triggered an ongoing dynamic by which governments from industrialized and developing countries, transnational corporations, and some NGOs push for the legal codification of neoliberal environmentalism. These findings suggest the emergence of a new environmental constitutionalism, which subdues all spheres of life to economic imperatives and simultaneously co-opts dissenting voices to increase the stability of inherently exploitative structures.

For almost 30 years, industrialised, emerging and developing countries negotiate on a substantive patent law harmonisation under the umbrella of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Although a common approach or at least some vague outlines of common ground seem beyond reach, all participants regularly agree on a continuation of the discussion process. Despite an incessant wheeling and dealing among delegates and WIPO officials, the only effect is that discussions still keep going on. In our paper, we draw on a synthesis of both neo-mercantilist and liberal institutionalist insights in order to explain the vibrant stalemate of substantive patent law harmonisation talks. We argue that WIPO's involvement in the negotiation process offers an incentive structure for states to continue negotiations even when a successful conclusion appears rather improbable or downright undesirable. WIPO officials do not necessarily oppose the alternative deployment of their resources and services, because national negotiators' tactics at least partially coincide with their own interests. The paper concludes with a summary of the major results and a discussion on their potential empirical and theoretical relevance for further studies.

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