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Abstract-This paper presents a general theory of event compensation as an information flow security enforcement mechanism for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). The fundamental research problem, in a broader sense, being investigated is the fact that externally observable events in modern CPSs have the propensity to divulge sensitive settings to adversaries, resulting in a confidentiality violation. This is a less studied yet emerging concern in modern system security. A viable method to mitigate such violations is to use information flow security based enforcement mechanisms since access control based security models cannot impose restrictions on information propagation. A very few (if not none) models consider security at a system level rather than disjoint (cyber, physical and network) components; the disjoint nature of security analysis is not appropriate for systems with highly integrated physical and cyber infrastructures. In this respect, the compensation based security framework, proposed here, is foundational work that unifies cyber and physical aspects of security through shared semantics of information flow.

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