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In this paper we investigate the optimal harvesting of a renewable natural resource. While in most standard approaches the resource is located at a single point, we allow the resource to be distributed spatially. Consequently, an agent who exploits the resource has to travel from one location to another. For a fixed planning horizon, we investigate the speed and the path of harvesting chosen by the agent. We show that the agent adjusts this speed so as to visit each location only once, even in the absence of travelling cost. Since the agent does not return to any location for a second harvest, it is optimal to fully deplete the resource upon arrival. A similar type of bang-bang solution results when we drop the assumption of a constant harvesting rate: allowing for a variable harvesting rate, the agent chooses to fully exploit the resource either in the last or in the first travelling period. A society interested in conserving some of the resource thus has to take measures to limit the exploitative behaviour of the agent.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) are not preserved in the presence of unemployment. In the present paper we challenge this view and investigate capital tax competition for some arbitrary institutional setting of the labor market. We find that if the labor market is characterized by some efficient bargaining solution, the results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) are preserved. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: H21, J51.

With direct trade barriers banned, governments may be tempted to use indirect policy tools to interfere with trade, such as environmental taxes. The author uses a model of an endogenous market structure, where the number of firms is determined by a zero-profit condition in one country but is exogenously given in the other country, to show that a government harboring a fixed number of firms fails to affect aggregate supply, and therefore has little scope for improving domestic environmental quality (if pollution is transboundary). Moreover, owing to the absence of a terms-of-trade effect, it diverts from the classical strategic tax rule. The author argues that both governments arguably fix their equilibrium emission taxes "too low," meaning that tax competition plausibly leads to "ecological dumping."