Differences in mortality by retirement age have an important impact on the financing of pension insurance, yet no clear-cut results for Germany exist so far. We calculate mortality rates by retirement age from microdata on all German old-age pensioners and 1.84 million deceases. The life expectancies and survival probabilities at age 65 are estimated for population subgroups according to creditable periods because of disease and pension income. Early-retired men who reach the age of 65 years live significantly longer the later early retirement occurs; the life expectancy at age 65 ranges from 13 to 17.8 years. For each retirement age, mortality of men is higher the more periods of disease are credited in the pension insurance system. For a given length of credited periods of disease, mortality of early retirees decreases with the retirement age. 'Healthy worker selection effects' operating in the labour market may contribute to these results. The 'work longer, live longer'-result is found for each pension income quintile, which resolves the J-curve pattern found in the literature. The mortality of female old-age pensioners varies little with retirement age.

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Age, human capital and the geography of innovation Abstract An aging labor force is often associated with a decreasing innovative performance on aggregate, firm or individual level. Using a regional knowledge production function to explain patenting activity in German districts, we propose to include the effect of age in a twofold specification: First, we account indirectly for age by including the aggregate, age-heterogeneous human capital available in each district and estimating its effect on patenting performance. Second, we assume that there is an age effect that is independent of human capital and therefore include the age structure of the districts' labor force directly, too. Possible explanations for an independent age-effect are age-dependent differences in the ability to exploit innovation-relevant human capital or age-specific motivation to lead creative ideas to successful inventions. Departing from these conceptualizations provided by economics and I-O psychology, we estimate a negative binomial regression model appropriate for count data. Results on German district level indicate that engineering knowledge in the younger as well as the prime age group significantly enhances patenting performance, whereas we do not find any effect for the age group 50+. However, for older ages, the stock of experience has a positive influence. On aggregate level, we find a positive independent age effect.

This paper studies the occurrence of dumping and the implications of anti-dumping duties in a deterministic price-setting two-period duopoly model for differentiated products. When current market shares matter for future demand, cost-based dumping can be profitable. Dumping thus arises as a form of investment in market shares. This might trigger the application of anti-dumping law. We further show that correctly anticipated duties do not necessarily hinder firms from selling below costs. The mere existence of anti-dumping law, however, significantly changes the structure of the game, leading to higher first-period prices for both firms. JEL Classification: F12, F13Parts de marché, dumping défini par les coûts, et politiques anti-dumping. Ce mémoire étudie le phénomène de dumping et les implications des droits compensatoires anti-dumping dans un modèle de duopole de produits différenciés dans un cadre de deux périodes où le processus de définition des prix est déterministe. Quand la nature présente des parts de marché a des conséquences sur la demande future, le dumping défini par les coûts peut être profitable. Dans ce cas, le dumping émerge en tant que forme d'investissement dans le renforcement des parts de marché. Voilà qui peut déclencher l'application de la loi antidumping. On montre que des droits compensatoires correctement anticipés n'empêchent pas nécessairement les entreprises de vendre à des prix plus bas que leurs coûts. Cependant, le seul fait de l'existence de la loi anti-dumping modifie substantiellement la structure du jeu et conduit les deux entreprises à établir des prix plus élevés dans la première période.We thank participants at the 1998 Vienna Session of the Industrieökonomischer Ausschuss and seminar participants at the University of Linz for helpful discussion. Our special thanks go to two anonymous referees for very helpful remarks on former drafts of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.