In China, dockless bike-sharing programs (DBSPs) have changed people’s travel modes, alleviated urban traffic congestion, and reduced carbon emissions. However, a number of DBSPs have experienced financial crises since 2018. This means that research on DBSPs must be considered not only in terms of the environment and technology, but also in the operation of the program. In this paper, we modeled the DBSP operations in a certain area using a system dynamics simulation approach. The main purpose was to explore the dynamics of the program’s operation process and evaluate possible improvement strategies for maximizing the revenue of the overall DBSP. Specifically, the analysis focused on the economic profits of DBSPs in an environment of competition and government regulation. The research findings revealed that the dockless bike-sharing industry has great economic profits, but in the current environment, the market needs to be regulated by the local government. If a DBSP does not introduce new technologies or find new profit channels, it will be difficult to develop sustainably by only relying on riding profits. In addition, we provide a case study of Mobike’s operations in Beijing to support these findings and validate the developed model. Finally, we discuss Mobike’s possible improvement strategies.

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Enterprises in low-carbon supply chains have been exploring blockchain technology in order to make carbon data transparent. However, there is still some opaque information in the market, such as the value-added service efficiency. How do supply chain members make decisions between information sharing and blockchain adoption? This study considers blockchain adoption and information sharing in a low-carbon supply chain with a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The retailer has private information about value-added services and decides how to share it with the manufacturer. We examine six combined strategies comprised of blockchain scenarios and information sharing formats (no sharing, voluntary sharing, and mandatory sharing). The results indicate that supply chain members prefer blockchain technology under no sharing and voluntary sharing. Under mandatory sharing, supply chain members have incentives to participate in blockchain when the value-added service efficiency exceeds a threshold value. While the manufacturer prefers to obtain the value-added service information, the retailer decides to share information depending on the value-added service efficiency. Besides, supply chain members’ attitude toward the sharing contract also depends on the value-added service efficiency.

By analyzing the impact of different fairness concerns on a green supply chain, this study determines the optimal decisions under different power structures and conducts a comparative analysis of them. The findings of this study are summarized as follows: 1) under the manufacturer-dominated structure, retail price, wholesale price, product greenness, the manufacturer's profit, the total profit of the supply chain, the manufacturer's utility, and the retailer's utility are all negatively correlated with fairness concerns, but positively correlated with the retailer's profit; 2) under the retailer-dominated structure, fairness concerns have no impact on retail price, product greenness, or the total profit of the supply chain, are positively correlated with wholesale price and the manufacturer's profit and utility, and are negatively correlated with the retailer's profit and utility; 3) under the Nash equilibrium structure, fairness concerns have no impact on the green supply chain.