To solve the financing problem of the food producers, we consider a two-echelon contract food supply chain composed of a family farm with capital constraints and a food processing enterprise. With no capital constraints as the benchmark model, we analyze optimal decisions of the family farm and the food processing enterprise in the case of bank financing with bank participation only and bank financing with “government, bank, and insurance” coparticipation. Then, we discuss how the risk of yield uncertainty influences the optimal decisions and profits of the family farm and the food processing enterprise under different financing situation. Meanwhile, the reason why the government subsidizes agriculture is explored, and the policy of minimum purchase price of the food is initiated when the market price is too low. Finally, the numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are presented. The results show that the bank financing with “government, bank, and insurance” coparticipation improves the welfare of supply chain members more obviously than the bank financing with bank participation only; when the rice price is too low, the policy of minimum purchase price of food is initiated, which increases the revenue and the growing enthusiasm of the family farm; the profits of the family farm and the food processing enterprise will decrease as the risk of yield uncertainty increases in the case of bank financing, and the risk of yield uncertainty will be reduced for the family farm when bank financing with “government, bank, and insurance” coparticipation.

Collusion can increase the transaction value among supply chain members to obtain higher loans from supply chain finance (SCF) service provider, which will bring some serious risks for SCF. However, it is difficult to be identified and restrain the SCF service provider due to its stability and hiddenness. Different SCF transaction structures will affect the profits of supply chain members from collusion. This paper develops various game models for collusion and not collusion for different SCF transaction structures and investigates the impact of SCF transaction structures on the boundary conditions of collusion. Through comparative analysis, the findings of models are as follows: (1) in a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier and retailer are more likely to conduct collusion under the sequential game than under the simultaneous game; (2) collusion in the two-echelon supply chain can obtain higher loans than that in the three-echelon supply chain, so it has more serious hidden danger; (3) in the two-echelon supply chain, collusion is easier to form than in the three-echelon SCF supply chain that has spontaneous endogenous constraints. We also develop two types of mechanisms to restrain collusion behavior from profit sharing and incomplete information perspectives. Finally, we summarize the theoretical implications and analyze the management implications through a case study.

With the advent of the smart economy, Chinese digital platform companies have begun the process of digital innovation. The sudden outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic in early 2020 has added a strong impulse to the acceleration of this process, highlighting the unique characteristics of the platform economy in resource allocation. Although digital platforms have already entered people’s daily lives, the profit mechanism of digital platforms remains a black box to be cracked for the industry. The main contribution of this paper is to propose a framework model for the profit mechanism of digital platforms, which to a certain extent solves the problems essential to the digital realm faced by many traditional enterprises in the Internet age—knowing that the profit theory of traditional monopolies is not suitable for the rapidly changing internet economy, but that most of the time people still must use it. In this new profit framework, we first use the symbiotic logic of value sharing to explain the underlying logic of platform profitability; secondly, from the perspective of resource complementarity, we find that the key to digital platform companies’ profitability lies in the symbiotic synergy between platform companies and massive userbases; lastly, our study finds that the profit condition of platform enterprises is digital capability, not system possession. This article will analyze the bottom layer of the digital economy and, by identifying the various drawbacks of the traditional industrial economic monopoly theory, propose three key factors for the profitability of platform companies in the digital age: flexible strategy, digital capabilities, and symbiotic synergy capabilities. On this basis, a theoretical model of the profit of a digital platform is constructed. Research shows that the hybrid structure of digital platforms and the need for external diversification together lead to a platform’s resilience strategy. The realization process of the platform’s strategic flexibility and the process of consumers obtaining the residual value will lead to an explosion in network effects, causing the platform and users to complete value co-creation and realize value sharing. The implementation of a flexible platform strategy also promotes the further development of a differentiation strategy and a more-refined division of labor for manufacturers, lowers the barriers-to-entry in the industry, and enables the platform and the manufacturers to realize value co-creation. On the one hand, platform enterprises can obtain greater market performance; on the other hand, users’ personalized needs can be more satisfied.