The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.

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Emerging stock markets have been identified as being at least partially segmented from global capital markets. As a consequence, it has been argued that local risk factors rather than world risk factors are the primary source of equity return variation in these markets. This paper seeks to address the question of whether macroeconomic variables may proxy for local risk sources. We find moderate evidence to support this hypothesis. Further, we investigate the degree of commonality in exposures across emerging stock market returns using a principal components approach. We find little evidence of commonalit y when emerging markets are considered collectively, however at the regional level considerable commonality is found to exist.