This Paper considers the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in relation to the free movement provisions of European Community law in relation to goods, persons, services and capital within the European Union. It examines the bases used by the Court in its application of Community free movement provisions to national measures that may seek to hinder the exercise of such rights. From limited enquiry originally founded on considerations of non discrimination based on nationality, to one most recently focussed on the ‘restriction’ to the free movement right, the Paper examines the methods employed by the Court of Justice in its scrutiny of the national measure appearing to conflict with Treaty free movement rights.The examination of the applicable free movement jurisprudence attempts to demonstrate the want of a thematically consistent underpinning within free movement case law. The Paper draws attention to the complexities and even the confusions that appear to be inherent within free movement jurisprudence and arguably evidenced within the Court's journey from ‘discrimination’ to ‘restriction’ as the basis of the enquiry with regard to the application of Treaty free movement rights. In its consideration of Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy, Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v. Percy Mickelsson v. Joakim Roos, recent jurisprudence with respect to the free movement of goods, the Paper notes that in the context of the ‘measure having equivalent effect’, the emphasis in the assessment of the national rule has shifted to an examination of the effect on market access, rather than a distinction based on the type of rule.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides with respect to the free movement of goods that “[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited.” In contrast, the TFEU provides that, with respect to the free movement of persons, services, and capital, restrictions at the national level on such rights are similarly unlawful.