This study examines the use of wine futures (i.e., advance selling of wine before it is bottled) as a form of operational flexibility to mitigate quality rating risk. At the end of a harvest season, the winemaker obtains a certain number of barrels of wine that can be produced for a particular vintage. While the wine is aging in the barrel, expert reviewers taste the wine and create a barrel score, indicating the potential quality of the wine and offering clues as to whether, when bottled, it will be superior wine. Based on the barrel score, the wine producer determines (1) the percentage of its wine to be sold as futures and (2) the price of the wine futures. After one more year of aging, the wine is bottled, and the reviewers provide a second review of the wine and assign a bottle score that influences the market price of the wine. Our study makes three contributions. First, we develop an analytical model that incorporates uncertain consumer valuations of wine futures and bottled wine and the uncertain bottle rating that is assigned to the wine at the end of the production process. Our analysis provides insights into how the barrel score, consumer preference (through a conditional-value-at-risk perspective) and the winemaker’s preference influence the winemaker’s allocation and pricing decisions. Our second contribution relates to the impact of consumer heterogeneity on the optimal allocation and pricing decisions. Contrary to common belief that the winemaker may be better off when consumers are more homogeneous, our results demonstrate that the winemaker can achieve a higher level of profitability when the market is filled with consumers that are heterogeneous. Third, we test our findings using data collected from Bordeaux wineries engaging in wine futures. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that (1) barrel scores play a significant role in the two decisions regarding the quantity and price of wine futures, and (2) the wine futures market provides a sizable financial benefit to the winemakers. Our analysis yields recommendations for artisanal and boutique wineries that have limited or no experience selling wine futures.

This study determines gender differences in the generation logic for green purchasing intention within the framework of bounded morality and bounded self-interest and determines the causes of the attitude–behavior gap from a new perspective. Empirical analysis of 977 sample data points is used to test the influencing mechanism of gender heterogeneity on green purchasing intention through altruistic values (ALVs) and egoistic values (EGVs). Meanwhile, the moderated mediation effects are also analyzed. The results show that gender heterogeneity negatively affects ALVs and positively affects EGVs for women as the reference group. The mediation effect of ALVs and EGVs is significant, and there are significant gender differences in the formation of values and green purchasing intention. As expected, women demonstrate higher levels of proenvironmental intention than men. Media exposure (ME) significantly moderates the mediation models. It negatively moderates the mediation effect of ALVs and positively moderates the mediation effect of EGVs. The results reveal the complex formation mechanism for green purchasing intention. It can conclude that the gender differences in terms of green purchasing, the different guiding roles of dual values, and the moderated mechanism of ME are key elements in accurate guidance of green consumption and the effective modification of the attitude–behavior gap.

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Tax incentives are one of the most important fiscal tools at the government's disposal that can be used to influence the economy. Often, policies are targeted to spur investment in durable goods. In this article, we focus on the impact that a primary‐market tax incentive has on the secondary market for durable goods – specifically, the automobile market. Using a first‐car tax rebate scheme implemented in Thailand in 2011 as a natural experiment, we find that the policy reduces the listing prices of used cars in the tax‐eligible category by 6.75% to 10.31%.