Although infrastructure is widely recognized as a key ingredient in a country's economic success, many issues surrounding infrastructure spending are not well understood. This paper explores six themes: the returns to infrastructure; the role of the private sector; the evaluation and delivery of infrastructure in practice; the nature of network industries, pricing and regulation; political economy considerations of infrastructure provision; and infrastructure in developing countries. This paper aims to provide insights into many of these questions, drawing on the existing literature.

 An inference problem with a penalty for mistakes and switching leads to a band of inaction  The band of inaction is the same as the band where you fail to reject H 0 , in a hypothesis test  Hypothesis tests now have a new micro-foundation *Highlights (for review)

We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs related to reported beliefs. We attempt to control for risk aversion using the Offerman et al. (Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1461–1489, 2009) technique. Against the baseline of Bayesian updating, we test for belief adjustment underreaction and overreaction and model the decision making process of the agent as a double hurdle model where agents with inferential expectations first decide whether to adjust their beliefs and then, if so, decide by how much. We also test the effects of increased inattention and complexity on belief updating. We find evidence for periods of belief inertia interspersed with belief adjustment. This is due to a combination of random belief adjustment; state-dependent belief adjustment, with many subjects requiring considerable evidence to change their beliefs; and quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment, with aggregate insufficient belief adjustment when a belief change does occur. Inattention, like complexity, makes subjects less likely to adjust their stated beliefs, while inattention additionally discourages full adjustment.

We incorporate inferential expectations into the Barro-Gordon model (1983a) of time inconsistency and consider reputational equilibria. The range of sustainable equilibria shrinks as the private sector becomes more belief-conservative.

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