H unger continues to be one of humanity's greatest challenges despite the existence of a more-than-adequate global food supply equal to , kilocalories for every person every day.  In measuring progress, policymakers and concerned citizens across the globe rely on information supplied by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), an agency of the United Nations. In  the FAO reported that in the wake of the - food-price spikes and global economic crisis, the number of people experiencing hunger worldwide since - had increased by  million, rising above  billion in .  However, in its State of Food Insecurity in the World  (SOFI )  the FAO presented new estimates, having revamped its methods and reinterpreted its hunger data back to . The revised numbers for the period - to - reverse the trend to a steadily falling one. Based on the FAO's new calculations, extreme undernourishment peaked in  at a record-breaking one billion, followed by a significant decline through , when progress stalled but did not reverse (see chart below).  Setting aside any question about the specific merits of the agency's new methodology, the FAO's primary measure does not capture the full extent of hunger. Additionally, SOFI 's overriding messages may obscure important policy

It has become an article of faith in international trade negotiations that farmers in developing countries have much to gain from agricultural trade liberalisation. This paper assesses the evidence for such claims, relying on World Bank data and analyses, United Nations trade data, and other economic modelling carried out to inform the current round of World Trade Organisation negotiations. It concludes that the promise of agricultural trade liberalisation is overstated, while the costs to small-scale farmers in developing countries are often very high.

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