The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act waived Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) work requirements nationally in 2010 and broadened the eligibility for receiving waivers in subsequent years for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWD). From 2011 to 2016, many states voluntarily imposed work requirements, while other areas became ineligible for waivers because of improved economic conditions. Did the work requirements increase employment as intended, or did the policy merely remove food assistance for ABAWD whodespite an improving economy-still could not find employment? Using data from the American Community Survey from 2010 to 2016, I analyze the influence of work requirements on employment and SNAP participation for ABAWD. I find that work requirements significantly decreased SNAP participation and marginally increased employment for ABAWD using Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences estimation. This study contributes to the current policy debates on the effectiveness of expanding or instituting work requirements for welfare programs. JEL Classification Codes: J21, J68, H42, H75

This paper examines issues related to asymmetric information in the life insurance market using data that links life insurance holdings with death records for a representative sample of purchasers. Unlike earlier work that found mixed results using a narrow age cohort, this analysis finds no compelling evidence for adverse selection in a broad age cohort.

No abstract

Using data from a university, we analyze a policy designed to increase employer‐sponsored life insurance. The university increased basic life insurance holdings, which nudged employees with supplemental coverage to have more life insurance. In large part due to inertia, the nudge increased life insurance holdings one‐for‐one for those who could have undone it. Additionally, we find that expanding coverage options significantly increased total life insurance holdings for new hires who were not subject to inertia. These policy changes reduced uninsured vulnerabilities for two‐thirds of employees. Our findings have important policy implications for addressing widespread disparities in life insurance coverage. (JEL D31, G22, D03, J32, J33, J38, H20)

We thank Compulife for generously providing life insurance pricing data. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.