Investigating cognitive processes by analyzing mouse movements has become a popular method in many psychological disciplines. When creating mouse-tracking experiments, researchers face many design choices-for example, whether participants indicate responses by clicking a button or just by entering the button area. Hitherto, numerous different settings have been employed, but little is known about how these methodological differences affect mouse-tracking data. We systematically investigated the influences of three central design factors, using a classic mouse-tracking paradigm in which participants classified typical and atypical exemplars. In separate experiments, we manipulated the response indication, mouse sensitivity, and starting procedure. The core finding that mouse movements deviate more toward the nonchosen option for atypical exemplars was replicated in all conditions. However, the size of this effect varied. Specifically, it was larger when participants indicated responses via click and when they were instructed to initialize the movement early. Trajectory shapes also differed between setups. For example, a dynamic start led to mostly curved trajectories, responses via click led to a mix of straight and Bchange-of-mind^trajectories, and responses via touch led to mostly straight trajectories. Moreover, the distribution of curvature indices was classified as bimodal in some setups and as unimodal in others. Because trajectory curvature and shape are frequently used to make inferences about psychological theories, such as differentiating between dynamic and dual-system models, this study shows that the specific design must be carefully considered when drawing theoretical inferences. All methodological designs and analyses were implemented using open-source software and are available from https://osf.io/xdp7a/.

Mouse-tracking is an increasingly popular process-tracing method. It builds on the assumption that the continuity of cognitive processing leaks into the continuity of mouse movements. Because this assumption is the prerequisite for meaningful reverse inference, it is an important question whether the assumed interaction between continuous processing and movement might be influenced by the methodological setup of the measurement. Here we studied the impacts of three commonly occurring methodological variations on the quality of mouse-tracking measures, and hence, on the reported cognitive effects. We used a mouse-tracking version of a classical intertemporal choice task that had previously been used to examine the dynamics of temporal discounting and the date-delay effect (Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, & Goschke, 2013). The data from this previous study also served as a benchmark condition in our experimental design. Between studies, we varied the starting procedure. Within the new study, we varied the response procedure and the stimulus position. The starting procedure had the strongest influence on common mouse-tracking measures, and therefore on the cognitive effects. The effects of the response procedure and the stimulus position were weaker and less pronounced. The results suggest that the methodological setup crucially influences the interaction between continuous processing and mouse movement. We conclude that the methodological setup is of high importance for the validity of mouse-tracking as a process-tracing method. Finally, we discuss the need for standardized mouse-tracking setups, for which we provide recommendations, and present two promising lines of research toward obtaining an evidence-based gold standard of mouse-tracking. Keywords Mouse-tracking. Action dynamics. Process-tracing. Boundary conditions. Intertemporal choice Decision science has experienced a paradigmatic shift evolving its focus, methods, and approaches from an outcomebased perspective toward a more process-oriented paradigm (Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015). This process paradigm acknowledges the temporal nature of basic mental processes and, hence, builds theories of choice incorporating perceptual, attentional, memory, and decisional processes. To test these process explanations, process-tracing methods are required. In the last 60 years, decision scientists introduced a variety of process-tracing methods to the field-for example, verbal protocols (e.g., Ericson & Simon, 1984), eye tracking (e.g., Russo & Rosen, 1975), and most recently, mouse-tracking (e.g., Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007; Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005) (for an overview, please see Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2017). Whenever scientists apply such process-tracing methods, they rely on specific prerequisites and core concepts in order to conduct the reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006): Reverse inference describes the reasoning by which the presence of a particular cognitive process is inferred from a pattern of neuroimaging or behavioral data (cf. Heit, 2015). One prerequi...

No abstract

From an embodiment perspective, action and cognition influence each other constantly. This interaction has been utilized in mouse-tracking studies to infer cognitive states from movements, assuming a continuous manifestation of cognitive processing into movement. However, it is mostly unknown how this manifestation is affected by the variety of possible design choices in mouse-tracking paradigms. Here we studied how three design factors impact the manifestation of cognition into movement in a Simon task with mouse tracking. We varied the response selection (i.e., with or without clicking), the ratio between hand and mouse cursor movement, and the location of the response boxes. The results show that all design factors can blur or even prevent the manifestation of cognition into movement, as reflected by a reduction in movement consistency and action dynamics, as well as by the adoption of unsuitable movement strategies. We conclude that deliberate and careful design choices in mouse-tracking experiments are crucial to ensuring a continuous manifestation of cognition in movement. We discuss the importance of developing a standard practice in the design of mouse-tracking experiments.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (10.3758/s13414-019-01889-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Cognitive flexibility is a central component of executive functions that allow us to behave meaningful in an ever changing environment. Here, we support a distinction between two different types of cognitive flexibility, shifting flexibility and spreading flexibility, based on independent underlying mechanisms commonly subsumed under the ability to shift cognitive sets. We use a homonym relatedness judgment task and combine it with mouse tracking to show that these two types of cognitive flexibility follow independent temporal patterns in their influence on participants' mouse movements during relatedness judgments. Our results are in concordance with the predictions of a neural field based framework that assumes the independence of the two types of flexibility. We propose that future studies about cognitive flexibility in the area of executive functions should take independent types into account, especially when studying moderators of cognitive flexibility.