Under what circumstances do new constitutions promote democracy? Between 1974 and 2011, the level of democracy increased in 62 countries following the adoption of a new constitution, but decreased or stayed the same in 70 others. Using data covering all 138 new constitutions in 118 countries during that period, we explain this divergence through empirical tests showing that overall increased participation during the process of making the constitution positively impacts postpromulgation levels of democracy. Then, after disaggregating constitution-making into three stages (drafting, debating, and ratification) we find compelling evidence through robust statistical tests that the degree of citizen participation in the drafting stage has a much greater impact on the resulting regime. This lends support to some core principles of “deliberative” theories of democracy. We conclude that constitutional reformers should focus more on generating public “buy in” at the front end of the constitution-making process, rather than concentrating on ratification and referendums at the “back end” that are unlikely to correct for an “original sin” of limited citizen deliberation during drafting.

Using an original data set assessing the effect of the 195 new constitutions worldwide over the past 40 years on levels of democracy, this article argues that when popular participation and group inclusion are both considered, inclusion is what matters. After showing that group inclusion generates more improvements in levels of democracy than mere participation in our data set of implemented constitutions, we address some of the prominent cases of constitution-writing failure that occur when individual participation is valued more highly than group inclusion. The article shows that even after unprecedented waves of popular participation through social media feedback (Egypt and Iceland) and focus groups and workshops (Chile), participation alone cannot generate constitutions that improve levels of democracy, or, sometimes, even the very promulgation of new constitutions. Indeed, using these cases as illustrations, we show how participation without inclusion is doomed to failure. We then show that high inclusion cases, even if they involve low participation (such as Tunisia 2014 and Colombia 1991), do generate democracy improvements.

The Tunisian constitutional reform experience in the wake of the Arab Spring—through which citizens were able to meet with their representatives, participate in public deliberation over the constitution, and offer their own proposals for the constitution—offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the debate on the optimal modality of constitutional processes by revisiting both deliberative and representative theories of democracy and their predictions on how the process can improve constitutional outcomes. The statistical analysis of a dataset of more than 2,500 citizen proposals and the content of three constitutional drafts shows that 43 percent of public proposals were included in the final draft of the constitution. The results also demonstrate that public input related to rights and freedoms is more likely to be reflected in the constitution compared to other public proposals. This article suggests that more inclusive processes can lead to more democratic constitutional outcomes, although this impact is contingent upon the incorporation of particular consensus-building institutions.

Under what circumstances do new constitutions improve a nation's level of democracy? Between 1974 and 2014, democracy increased in 77 countries following the adoption of a new constitution, but it decreased or stayed the same in 47 others. This book demonstrates that increased participation in the forming of constitutions positively impacts levels of democracy. It is discovered that the degree of citizen participation at the 'convening stage' of constitution-making has a strong effect on levels of democracy. This finding defies the common theory that levels of democracy result from the content of constitutions, and instead lends support to 'deliberative' theories of democracy. Patterns of constitutions are then compared, differentiating imposed and popular constitution-making processes, using case studies from Chile, Nigeria, Gambia, and Venezuela to illustrate the dynamics specific to imposed constitution-making, and case studies from Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, and Tunisia to illustrate the specific dynamics of popular constitution-making.

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