The following conventions are used in this publication: • In tables, a blank cell indicates "not applicable," ellipsis points (.. .) indicate "not available," and 0 or 0.0 indicates "zero" or "negligible." Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding. • An en dash (-) between years or months (for example, 2005-06 or January-June) indicates the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between years or months (for example, 2005/06) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY (for example, FY2006). • "Billion" means a thousand million; "trillion" means a thousand billion. • "Basis points" refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point). As used in this publication, the term "country" does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.

The oil market is undergoing fundamental change. New technologies are increasing the supply of oil from old and new sources, while rising concerns over the environment are seeing the world gradually moving away from oil. This spells a significant challenge for oil-exporting countries, including those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) who account for a fifth of the world’s oil production. The GCC countries have recognized the need to reduce their reliance on oil and are all implementing reforms to diversify their economies as well as fiscal and external revenues. Nevertheless, as global oil demand is expected to peak in the next two decades, the associated fiscal imperative could be both larger and more urgent than implied by the GCC countries’ existing plans.

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We examine the existing fiscal policy paradigm in commodity-exporting countries. First, we argue that its centerpiece-the permanent income hypothesis (PIH)-is not consistent with either intergenerational equity or long-term sustainability in the presence of uncertainty. Policies to achieve these goals need to be more prudent and better anchored than the PIH. Second, we point out the presence of a volatility tradeoff between government spending and wealth and reassess long-held views on the appropriate fiscal anchors, the vice of procyclicality, and the (im)possibility of simultaneously smoothing consumption and ensuring intergenerational equity and sustainability. Finally, we propose what we call a prudent wealth stabilization policy that would be more consistent with long-term fiscal policy goals, yet relatively simple to implement and communicate.