I construct a theoretical framework for expert product reviews and demonstrate how the existence of positive network effects can make review inflation profitable even when consumers are rational. This finding moreover suggests that product reviews may serve as a coordination mechanism for early adopters. In an empirical application to the video game journalism industry, I find evidence that reviews are inflated for games produced by large firms and for those that are part of pre‐existing game franchises. Additionally, I find variation in inflation across genres that would be inconsistent with common alternative theories of inflation, such as consumer naivete.

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Many firms that produce expert product reviews benefit from increased sales of the products they review, resulting in a conflict of interest. We evaluate expert product reviews from a video game magazine owned by a game retailer. We find evidence of review inflation for lower‐quality games and in periods shortly following the release of a game's corresponding hardware. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions for a firm that optimizes the trade‐off between sales revenue and the reputational costs associated with biasing reviews.

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