Research summary:Integrating the behavioral and institutional perspectives, we propose that a country's formal institutions, particularly its legal frameworks, affect managers' deployment of slack resources. Specifically, we explore the moderating effects of creditor and employee rights on the performance effects of slack. Using longitudinal data from 162,633 European private firms in 26 countries, we find that financial slack enhances firm performance at diminishing rates, whereas human resource (HR) slack lowers performance at diminishing rates. However, financial slack has a more positive effect on firm performance in countries with weaker creditor rights, whereas HR slack has a more negative effect on performance in countries with stronger employee rights. The results provide a richer view of the relationship between slack and firm performance than currently assumed in the literature. Managerial summary:A key dilemma managers often encounter is whether, on the one hand, they should build in excess resources to buffer their firms from internal and external shocks and to pursue new opportunities or whether, on the other hand, they should develop "lean" firms. Our study suggests that excess cash resources-which are usually viewed as easy to redeploy-benefit firm performance, especially when firms operate in countries with weaker creditor rights. However, excess human resources-which are usually viewed as more difficult to redeploy-hamper firm performance, particularly when firms operate in countries with stronger labor protection laws. Thus, the management of slack resources critically depends on the characteristics of these resources (e.g., redeployability) and the institutional context in which managers operate. 1 The absolute level of a given resource a firm has could depend on the national institutional framework in which it operates. However, we look at slack resources available in a firm adjusted for industry and country norms. This implies that the level of slack is not dependent on the country-level institutions or any country-level variable.3 These quadratic relationships are often referred to in the literature as inverted U-shaped (e.g., Nohria and Gulati, 1996;Tan and Peng, 2003). However, following Kim and Bettis (2014), we use the term quadratic relationship since inverted U-shaped implies that the peak lies within the valid range of the data set, which is not always true and remains subject to empirical scrutiny.

Financing decisions, Pecking order theory, Debt capacity, Growth, G32, L26,

Building upon prior research that demonstrates how the limited knowledge of finance alternatives of entrepreneurs may cause suboptimal finance decisions, this paper examines how entrepreneurs' human and social capital influence their knowledge of finance alternatives. For this purpose, we use survey data from 103 Belgian start-ups. Results demonstrate that entrepreneurs with a business education and entrepreneurs with experience in accountancy or finance have a broader knowledge of finance alternatives. Having a strong network in the financial community is further positively associated with the knowledge of finance alternatives. However, generic human capital, including higher education, industry experience, and management experience, is almost not related with the knowledge of finance alternatives.

Past research has shown that new firms can facilitate resource mobilization by signaling their unobservable quality to prospective resource providers. However, we know less about situations in which firms convey multiple signals of different strengths-i.e., signals that are more or less correlated with unobservable firm quality. Building on a sociocognitive perspective, we propose that prospective resource providers respond differently to signals of different strengths and that the effectiveness of signals, especially weak signals, will be contingent on the media attention new firms receive. Empirically, we conduct a longitudinal analysis examining the ability of new private equity (PE) firms to raise a follow-on fund. Consistent with our theory, we find that unrealized performance, a relatively weak signal, positively influences fundraising. But we fail to find statistical evidence that its effect is weaker than that of realized performance, a relatively strong signal. Further, media attention strengthens the relationship between unrealized performance and fundraising, but media attention exerts less impact on the relationship between realized performance and fundraising. Taken together, our findings deepen our understanding of how new firms can mobilize resources with signals of different strengths and of how the mediaas a key information intermediary-differently impacts their effectiveness.

In this study, we seek to further delineate factors that condition the relationship between slack resources and firm performance. To do so, we develop and test a model that establishes the role of venture capital (VC) and angel investors as powerful external stakeholders who positively moderate the slack–performance relationship. In addition, we provide more insight into this relationship by examining differences between these two types of private investors and by examining the role of their ownership stakes. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 1215 private firms, including VC‐backed firms, angel‐backed firms, and similar firms without such investors. We find that the presence of VC investors positively moderates the relationship between both financial and human slack resources and firm performance, while angel investors only positively moderate the effect of human resource slack. Further, VC investors are only marginally better at helping entrepreneurs to extract value from human resource slack than angel investors and they are no better when it comes to financial slack. Finally, we find that the impact of financial and human resource slack on firm performance is more positive in VC‐backed firms when investors hold high ownership stakes, an effect which is significantly stronger than when angel investors hold high ownership stakes.