In this paper we study the determinants of gross capital flows, project the size of China's international investment position in 2020, and analyze the implications for the renminbi real exchange rate if China liberalizes the capital account. We assume in this exercise that the renminbi will have largely achieved capital account convertibility by the end of the current decade, a timetable consistent with recent proposals by the People's Bank of China. Our analysis shows that if the capital account were liberalized, China's gross international investment position would grow significantly, and inflows and outflows would become much more balanced. The private sector would turn its net liability position into a balanced position, and the official sector would reduce its net asset position significantly, relative to the country's GDP. Because of the increasing importance of private sector foreign claims and the decreasing importance of official foreign reserves, China would be able to earn higher net investment income from abroad. Overall, China would continue to be a net creditor, with the net foreign asset position as a share of GDP remaining largely stable through this decade. These findings suggest that the renminbi real exchange rate would not be particularly sensitive to capital account liberalization as capital flows are expected to be two-sided. The renminbi real exchange rate would likely be on a path of moderate appreciationas China is expected to maintain a sizeable growth differential with its trading partners.

Little is known about the total factor productivity of the nontradable sectors in China. In this paper we estimate productivity growth of the nontradable sectors by studying the relative price movements of the nontradable sectors vis-à-vis the tradable sectors, i.e. changes in the internal real exchange rate. We find that prices of the nontradable sectors have risen significantly faster than those of the tradable sectors since China's accession to the WTO, and as a result China's internal real exchange rate has appreciated faster than the renminbi real effective exchange rate. We also find that the nontradable sectors have seen much lower productivity growth than the tradable sectors. We argue that it is important to raise China's productivity growth in the nontradable sectors through policy actions to achieve growth rebalancing and containing inflationary pressures in the medium run.

This paper uses a Bayesian vector‐autoregressive model with sign restrictions to estimate the underlying drivers of Hong Kong's housing price dynamics in the short run. While existing studies are useful in analysing housing valuation, little attention has been paid to the short‐run dynamics. In contrast, the present paper identifies short‐run drivers of housing prices using structural identification with theoretical underpinnings. We find that among the shocks that we have identified, bank lending shock and housing supply shock were the main factors affecting Hong Kong's housing prices. Low mortgage rates were another key factor that led to the significant increase in housing prices after the global financial crisis.

No abstract

No abstract