The emergence of conflicts between environmental safety incidents and protection rights generates sizeable political costs, which endangers the legitimacy of the government as well as political security and stability. This article further examines the role of political costs in environmental issues. First, political costs in relation to environmental issues are defined. An equilibrium strategic analysis is then presented using an evolutionary game model in which the strategic behavioral choices of government, enterprises, and citizens are investigated by embedding political costs in the environmental governance system. Furthermore, the small-signal model was innovatively applied to simulate and analyze the stability of political costs under different equilibrium strategies in the system. The results show the following. (1) Pubic behavior and government are the dominant factors that impact stability and instability, respectively. Public behavior is the core element that affects political cost consumption. (2) When political costs are extremely depleted, the public will neglect economic interests, turn toward environmental interests, and choose the negative participation strategy, which destabilizes the system. (3) The political cost signal at the optimal equilibrium point not only warns the government not to take the desperate action of concealing information asymmetry but also allows the government to let go of its hands to deal with the environmental issues. Corresponding policy recommendations are proposed.

Online ride-hailing in China brings convenience for the public, but it has caused several problems, such as inadequate supervision, data security risks, and financial risks. This new industry has also disrupted the traditional taxi market. China’s government implemented some policies, which were initially disorderly tightening, and then formed the policy system responding to various needs for tackling these issues gradually. There were some policy fluctuations and regulatory effects during this period, therefore, it is imminent to evaluate the online ride-hailing policy text. In this paper, we took 43 online ride-hailing policies as samples, with the consideration of policy instruments and statistical inspection methods. In this paper, we also constructed an innovative three-dimensional analysis framework by combining content analysis, and further identify the ride-hailing policy development during different stages of development periods (2016–2022). Digging into the problems existing in the new online ride-hailing, policies were drawn by module division, unit coding, inductive statistics, the quantitative evaluation of policy text content, and TOE (technology-organization-environment) style analysis. Finally, we provide insightful policy recommendations for online ride-hailing policies, committed to providing theoretical support and a decision-making basis for governance policies in the transportation industry.

It is of great reference significance for broadening the research perspective of pandemic governance, improving the efficiency of pandemic governance and the credibility of the government, to scientifically measure and analyze the public medical and health system costs. This article takes the typical case “pandemic prevention and control event of S city, China” as the research background. First, the concept of public medical and health system costs during pandemic governance is defined. Then, the public medical and health system costs are embedded into the pandemic governance system, and the generation process of the public medical and health system costs in the actual situation are investigated. Furthermore, through in-depth interview, multi-case grounded theory and fuzzy subordinate function analysis, the scientific construction of the public medical and health system cost index system are completed. Finally, based on G1 method/entropy method combined with weighting and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method, the public medical and health system costs of the pandemic prevention and control events of S city is measured. The results show the following: (1) it is important that good single dimensions and reliable indicators are embodied in the public medical and health system costs scale. Among them, the behavioral public medical and health system costs of the masses is the largest proportion of all indicators; (2) after the pandemic prevention and control event is over, the public medical and health system cost are difficult to repair, and some lagging ideas and behaviors shown by local governments lead to a continuous expansion of the public medical and health system costs associated with pandemic governance; and (3) local governments should not conceal information asymmetry. Instead, local governments should give greater freedom to other actors to deal with pandemic governance, and governance entities should cooperate with each other. This will mitigate the effect of public medical and health system costs. Corresponding policy recommendations are proposed.