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This chapter distinguishes two attitudes often referred to as ‘gratitude’—prepositional gratitude and appreciation—and it explores the ways that each of these attitudes influences meaning in life. It argues that prepositional gratitude, the fitting response to benevolence, enhances meaning in life by bolstering one’s sense of self-worth, motivating altruistic behaviour, fostering deep social relationships, and integrating individuals into communities. But it can also leave individuals burdened with commitments, in the form of debts of gratitude; and if one owes gratitude but fails to respond appropriately or fails to balance gratitude against other virtues, one risks the sort of immoral behaviour that could undermine meaningfulness in a life. Appreciation, like prepositional gratitude, can bring meaning to life in several ways. It can motivate meaningful projects, for instance, and connect individuals to value. But appreciating the wrong things, or appreciating the right things too little or too much, can undermine meaning in life as well.

In this article I consider the claim that we ought to be grateful to nature and argue that this claim is unjustified. I proceed by arguing against the two most plausible lines of reasoning for the claim that we ought to be grateful to nature: 1) that nature is a fitting or appropriate object of our gratitude, and 2) that gratitude to nature enhances, preserves or indicates in us the virtue of gratitude, a character trait we morally ought to have. My arguments against the first line of reasoning show it to be unsound, and my arguments against the second reveal that we actually have reasons to avoid being grateful to nature. If we have reasons to treat nature well, I show, these may be rooted in the appropriateness of attitudes like praise, appreciation or compassion, but not gratitude. I conclude by highlighting several implications my arguments entail about gratitude to entities other than nature and about environmental virtues other than gratitude.

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