I was there at the end of the Cold War in 1989 when a vision of common security by global governance seemed within reach by multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations. This was a rational policy for all states. Then I watched with growing trepidation how the West led by the US undermined the practically universal acclaim of the Western Normative Project and power by moving from multilateralism to unilateral power and coercion. Today, an authoritarian project led by Russia, brokers political solutions in the regional conflicts left by Western policy failures. The article argues that theories on cognitive and emotional construction must upgrade the traditional methodology of diplomacy to understand why the West lost its position, and how it can be reclaimed. A strategic discourse must harness these theories to persuade more effectively by leaving contentious issues and instead evoke visions of common security by global governance.

The EU now needs to innovate policies towards the Middle East. The disastrous consequences of the military intervention in Libya are for all practical purposes a European mistake. The air campaign was originally a French initiative with Norway taking a lead role. By the perception of failure, it most likely caused inaction towards the regime in Syria. Only a concert of the regional states can create a new regional political order, and an innovative EU policy needs to engage these states for this purpose. A regional concert is the yet untried option in Western policy towards the Middle East. An effective EU diplomacy is to engage parties in envisioning an alternative regional political order by the analogy of European transformation from violent confrontation to pragmatic cooperation. EU, Middle East, common security, strategy, discourse.

FNs totalforbud mot atomvåpen er innlysende riktig. Forpliktelsene går neppe lenger enn Ikkespredningsavtalen, som Norge sluttet seg til allerede i 1970. Avskrekking med atomvåpen forutsetter at de må være klare til bruk for å bli umulige å bruke. Særlig i kriser blir en slik tankegang lett farlig fordi den kan utløse atomkrig ved misforståelser. Likevel er den norske regjeringens motstand mot FNs totalforbud rasjonell fordi hensikten er å forebygge en endring i oppfatning om maktbalanse som kunne undergrave Norges selvstendighet. Spørsmålet blir derfor om risiko for atomkrig kan reduseres uten å øke fare for press, og i verste fall angrep? Artikkelen presenterer egen forskning om hvordan konfrontasjonen i første halvdel av 1980-tallet mellom de to tyske stater førte til risiko for storkrig utløst av gjensidige misforståelser på begge sider av det daværende jernteppet. Teorier om tankeprosesser forklarer misforståelsene som universelle kognitive begrensninger. Forholdene i dag er på vesentlige punkter sammenliknbare med første halvdel av 1980-årene, da det på tross av spenninger likevel var rom for initiativ til felles sikkerhet. Artikkelen konkluderer derfor med at Norge bør slutte seg til FNs totalforbud mot atomvåpen, og sammen med Sverige ta initiativ til en felleseuropeisk dialog med Russland om en europeisk sikkerhetsordning bygd på forestillinger om felles sikkerhet. Abstract in English:Norwegian Support for the UN’s Total Ban on Nuclear Weapons?The article argues that while the UN ban on nuclear arms is obviously sensible, the Norwegian Government’s objections are still rational. Rejecting the US nuclear arms umbrella undermines deterrence to the degree that is the perception. The article sets out how cognitive processes determine perceptions of deterrence and risks of war. Shifting nuclear strategies are attempts to cope with the contradiction between deterrence and the inherent impossible choice of nuclear war. The Cold War in the first half of the 1980s shows how nuclear arms, though intended as deterrence, in a confrontation may be misperceived as a looming attack. This misperception almost caused nuclear war by inadvertence, as it could again. The fear of attack may prompt a compelling sense of urgency for a preemptive strike. This is the only real risk of large-scale war in Europe. Therefore, the Norwegian Government should join the UN ban on nuclear arms to reduce tensions in Europe. In a joint initiative with Sweden, which has already endorsed the ban, Norway should persuade other European states to enable a political process with Russia towards a European common security without the looming threat of nuclear arms. Military force should not exceed the minimum required to block intimidation, coercion, and low-intensity aggression.

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European countries must assume the leadership vacated by the United States under President Trump by a bold new political initiative in the Middle East. The EU should engage Saudi Arabia on extending the consultations and cooperation within the GCC – the Gulf Cooperation Council – to the other major regional states, in addition to Saudi Arabia they are Iran, Turkey and Israel. These states form the Middle East state system by mutually generating their behaviour. Specifically, the EU should urge that GCC adapt the EU third country and neighbourhood policies that would be the quickest way to turn the GCC into the EU of the Middle East. A strategic discourse adapting a model from cognitive behavioural therapy can introduce the European transformation as a vision in the state system.