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This study examines the impact of strengthening bank capital supervision on bank behavior in the incomplete and complete enforcement of regulations. In a dynamic model of banks facing idiosyncratic shocks, banks accumulate regulatory capital and decrease charter value and lending in the short run, while in the long run, the banking system achieves stability. To test the short-run implications, we utilize the introduction of the prompt corrective action program in Japan as a natural experiment. Using some empirical specifications with bank-and loan-level data, we find empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions.

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This study examines how micro-and macro-prudential policies work and interact with each other over the credit cycles using a dynamic general equilibrium model of financial intermediaries. Micro-prudential policies restrict the excess risk-taking of individual institutions, while taking real interest rates (prices) as given. By contrast, macro-prudential policies control the aggregate credit supplied (equilibrium outcome) by internalizing prices or the general equilibrium effect. The proposed model indicates that: (i) micro-prudential policy alone cannot completely remove inefficient credit cycles; (ii) when macro-prudential policy is conducted jointly with the micro-prudential one, policymakers can improve banks' credit quality and remove inefficient credit cycles completely without sacrificing the total credit supply; and (iii) the contributions of microand macro-prudential policies to the improvement in social welfare are roughly comparable.