The necessity for reducing the runoff of nitrogen from the sugar industry into Queensland's Great Barrier Reef has been recognized by governments and scientists for decades. Governments have unsuccessfully attempted to address this problem through legislation, regulation, and educating stakeholders. Officials have also understood that farmers' resistance was a problem because reform involved asking them to change the farming methods of a lifetime. This paper examines an innovative program, the Burdekin nitrogen trial (RP20) that significantly changed industry practices in an important sugar cane growing region in Australia. One of the key challenges to achieving success was the public servantsthe policy entrepreneursand their ability to convert a farmeran open minded skepticinto a policy champion. Through the adoption of a risky and previously untried collaboration strategy between public servants and this open-minded skeptic, an entrenched and formally opposing group of stakeholders began working with government to implement RP20, an innovative plan to overcome farmer resistance and reduce nitrogen runoff. As RP20 unfolded we gain insight into how the bureaucrats shed old ways of doing business, and became effective agents of policy change. These public servants grasped the window of opportunity that opened unexpectedly, reframed the policy problem and replaced the cane farmers' skepticism and resistance with high levels of trust and rapport.

The Queensland Police and Community Safety Review (PACSR) 2013 headed by Mick Keelty was tasked by the Queensland government to examine the State's emergency management practices and processes. Commissioned before any crisis, the PACSR was still collecting evidence when extensive flooding occurred across many regional centres of Queensland in 2013. It was the subsequent management of this event, and selected evidence from earlier inquiries that underpinned many of the findings in the final PACSR report. Keelty recommended institutional and organizational restructuring that included the abolition of a department, and the tasking of the fire and rescue service with additional oversight and audit functions. PACSR argued too much emphasis was placed on relationships, which made disaster management in Queensland potentially unsustainable in the longer term. Some of the findings replicated those of earlier inquiries (O'Sullivan 2009;QFCI 2012), including the apparent reluctance by police to implement communications systems that are interoperable with other emergency agencies. This reluctance to embrace new technologies indicates institutional and cultural barriers to reform. Despite this, the Police and Fire and Rescue services have been given additional responsibilities by the Newman government, based on Keelty's recommendations. PACSR did not appear to evaluate some of the best practice aspects of the 2010-2011 flooding event, whereas some suggest the report had a predetermined element to it (Byrne 2014). In finding that too much emphasis was placed on informal relationships and networks in 2013, and concentrating on structural reforms instead, this paper argues that the PACSR discounted many features that current crisis literature notes as important for a successful disaster management response.

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