No abstract

Using looking-time measures, the authors examined untrained chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) ability to distinguish between adequate and inadequate support. In 3 experiments, the chimpanzees' sensitivity to different support relations between 2 objects was assessed. In each experiment, the chimpanzees saw a possible and an impossible test event, presented as digital video clips. Looking times in the 3 experiments suggest that chimpanzees use amount of contact between 2 objects, but not type of contact, to distinguish between adequate and inadequate support relations. These results indicate that chimpanzees have some intuition about support phenomena but their sensitivity to relational object properties may differ from that of human infants (Homo sapiens) in this domain.

We investigated whether great apes, like human infants, monkeys and dogs, are subject to a strong gravity bias when tested with the tubes task, and--in case of mastery--what the source of competence on the tubes task is. We presented 22 apes with three versions of the tubes task, in which an object is dropped down a tube connected to one of three potential hiding places and the subject is required to locate the object. In two versions, apes were confronted with a causal tube that varied in the amount of perceptual information it provided (i.e. presence or absence of acoustic cues). The third version was a non-causal adaptation of the task in which a painted line 'connected' dropping and hiding places. Results indicate that apes neither have a reliable gravity bias when tested with the tubes, nor understand the causal function of the tube. Even though there is evidence that they can integrate tube-related causal information to localize the object, they seem to depend mainly on non-causal inferences when searching for an invisibly displaced object.

Three experiments modeled after infant studies were run on four great ape species (Gorilla gorilla, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus) to investigate their reasoning about solidity and gravity constraints. The aims were: (a) to find out if great apes are subject to gravity biased search or display sensitivity for object solidity, (b) to check for species differences, and (c) to assess if a gravity hypothesis or more parsimonious explanations best account for failures observed. Results indicate that great apes, unlike monkeys, show no reliable gravity bias, that ape species slightly differ in terms of their performance, and that the errors made are best explained by a gravity account.Keywords: invisible displacement, object solidity, gravity error, naïve physicsVarious constraints, such as gravity, inertia, or solidity, act upon a moving object, shaping its pathway through time and space. To locate an invisibly displaced object, an infant must have some knowledge of how these constraints interact to determine the future trajectory of the object moving out of sight (Baillargeon,

The relationship between language and thought is controversial. One hypothesis is that language fosters habits of processing information that are retained even in non-linguistic domains. In left-branching (LB) languages, modifiers usually precede the head, and real-time sentence comprehension may more heavily rely on retaining initial information in working memory. Here we presented a battery of working memory and short-term memory tasks to adult native speakers of four LB and four right-branching (RB) languages from Africa, Asia and Europe. In working memory tasks, LB speakers were better than RB speakers at recalling initial stimuli, but worse at recalling final stimuli. Our results show that the practice of parsing sentences in specific directions due to the syntax and word order of our native language not only predicts the way we remember words, but also other non-linguistic stimuli.