In response to the multitude of corruption allegations levelled against him, former president Zuma and his supporters typically sing a song called ‘Wenzeni uZuma’ (‘What has Zuma done wrong?’). This paper takes up this question from a jurisprudential (theoretical) point of view; that is, by probing the various senses in which prima facie corrupt conduct can be said to be unlawful in Africa. This question is explored through the application of the conceptual machinery of argumentation theory and criminal law theory. This paper discusses the Feinbergian, positivistic, contractual, legal moralism and the argumentum ad ignorantiam senses in which prima facie corrupt conduct can be said to be unlawful. It is then argued that prima facie corrupt conduct should most appropriately be conceived of as being unlawful in the contractual sense that a designated official diverts a particular benefit away from a de jure beneficiary and towards a de faco beneficiary.

This article focuses on the feasibility of dolus eventualis in addressing the problem of intended endangerments — that is, the question as to how the secondary consequences flowing from an act of endangerment, as distinguishable from an attack, can be said to be ‘intended’ (dolus). This problem manifests typically in the form of the orthodox marketplace bomb-thrower who has one primary aim but whose actions result in several other secondary consequences, some of which may not have been aimed or foreseen in any primary sense. After discussing why the two historical solutions — strict liability and the versari doctrine — are not viable answers to this problem, the remainder of the article examines the feasiblity of dolus eventualis as a third contemporary solution. This examination focuses on both the historical contradictions as well as the prevailing doctrinal controversies that are associated with dolus eventualis. The fourth part of the article reflects on five uncontroverted problems that currently beset dolus eventualis. The article concludes on a sceptical note: that dolus eventualis may not survive the many difficulties discussed in this article, and that exploring the expansion of negligence or the creation of a separate and new third form of fault may not be a bad idea.

The evaluation of evidence is a process about which not much is written, nor is it regulated as much as the comparable processes of admissibility and forms of presenting evidence are in South African evidence scholarship. This article follows the example set by Paizes by arguing for the introduction of a general theory of ‘proof’, which is used interchangeably with ‘evaluation’ in the article. After briefly introducing the existing doctrine, which consists mainly of a handful of the rules and guidelines that South African courts typically use to evaluate evidence, the article offers six justifications for the introduction of a general theory of proof in South African evidence scholarship. The third part of the article gives a methodological account of what is meant by a general theory of evidential proof in South African evidence scholarship. Part IV of the article comprises a discussion of the two foundational conditions required for a South African theory of proof.

The latest edition of Snyman’s Criminal Law has reached the status of scholarly immortality. It has been revised by Hoctor, but Snyman’s name lives on. This is consistent with the argument made in Part one of the review of this book. This is a review conducted through a trilogy of papers, analogous to WEB du Bois’s trilogy of novels entitled the Black Flame. Part one begins by clarifying why this review is conducted in this way. The paper then proceeds to contextualise Snyman’s Criminal Law alongside the two dominant traditions of South African criminal law, following the work of Gardiner and Lansdown and De Wet and Swanepoel. Thirdly, the paper concludes by developing the argument that South African criminal law remains in a perpetual northbound-gaze towards Europe and away from Africa. This theme is developed further in Parts two and three of this review.

While it has revolutionised Evidence scholarship in the Euro-American world (mainly common law jurisdictions), the New Evidence Scholarship (‘NES’) movement is yet to arrive on African shores. African Evidence scholarship still largely reflects the relatively antiquated ‘golden age of doctrinal Evidence scholarship’, anchored by leading figures such as Bentham, Stephen, Thayer and Wigmore. This essay draws from the clarion call made historically by Biko and Sobukwe, among several other Africans, for Africa to avoid occupying a seat at a table that has already been set for it, typically in Europe. Africa approaches NES relatively late in the game, but it is contended in this essay that this presents the continent with an opportunity to draw insights from the developments of NES in the Euro-American world with a view of making its own contribution to this burgeoning field of scholarship. This essay suggests that the recognition of the special relativity of evidential proof may be a useful foundation for much broader theorising about evidence and proof in Africa. The essay concludes by using two models of proving the conduct and unlawfulness elements of the crime of corruption to illustrate the implications of this probative theory of special relativity.