In the Eurosystem, banks' interest rate expectations should no longer have resulted in a non-zero tender spread, the difference between marginal and minimum price for liquidity, when the ECB reformed its operational framework for monetary policy implementation in March 2004 so that the policy rates remain constant within reserves maintenance periods. Yet, the tender spread was wider in 2005 than in any single year after 2000, when the ECB switched from fixed to variable rate tenders. Parts of the relevant literature have argued that because of the ECB's asymmetric preferences over deviations of the market rates up and down from the policy rate, the shortest euro interest rates persistently exceed the policy rate This paper argues, however, that when the central bank applies a quantity oriented liquidity policy, a positive tender spread may result from money market inefficiencies and banks' risk aversion even if the central bank preferences are symmetric and the markets do not anticipate any changes in the policy rates. In such a case, the driving force behind the tender spread is banks' uncertainty about their individual allotments at the marginal rate for the Eurosystem main refinancing operations (MROs). Furthermore, the allotment uncertainty is shown to be significantly related to the amount of liquidity supplied in each operation. Hence, the expansion in the MRO volumes experienced since 2002 may have had a major contribution to the emergence and observed growth of the tender spread.

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of the determination of equilibrium in the interbank market for overnight liquidity when the central bank uses fixed rate tenders in its liquidity provision. We consider three alternative liquidity policy rules. First, the central bank may provide the bid amounts in full. Alternatively, the central bank can scale back the bid amounts pro rata with the individual bids. For the latter case, we consider two target options for the central bank: liquidity or an interest rate. We show that the expected overnight rate remains more tightly in the hands of the central bank if the full allotment procedure or a pure interest rate targeting rule is used than if liquidity targeting is used. We will also demonstrate how optimal bidding in tender operations varies considerably according to which procedure is chosen by the central bank.

Monetary policy before the Great Recession rested on three unacknowledged assumptions: first, the central bank could effectively control a short-term rate; second, this short-term rate had a stable relationship with longer/riskier rates; third, the central bank could move the short-term rate up or down as needed. In one or the other phase of the Great Recession one or more of these assumptions no longer held. The Fed and the ECB reacted to these difficulties, adding balance sheet management to their weaponry. After the failure of Lehman Brothers, measures of financial stress exploded and the banking sector was affected by an acute lack of liquidity, large losses, a disproportion between diminished capital and a riskier balance sheet, low profitability, enhanced competition of shadow banks, deleveraging, and difficulties in raising new capital. The Fed and the ECB could address some, but not all, of these problems.

This paper constructs an equilibrium model for the short-term money market, when the central bank provides liquidity via variable rate tenders. The relation between market rate of interest and liquidity is derived from a single bank's profit maximisation problem in the interbank market, and the CB determines its liquidity provision by minimising a quadratic loss function that contains both deviations of expected market rate from CB target rate and differences between liquidity supply and target liquidity. We model equilibrium bid behaviour in the tenders and explain the underbidding phenomenon resulting from the minimum bid rate. We also show that, when maturities of consecutive operations overlap, the expected market interest rate will rise above the CB's target whenever a target rate change (hike or cut) is expected to occur in the same reserve maintenance period. Finally, we review the data from the ECB variable rate tenders and find that the ECB has been fairly liquidity oriented in its allotment decisions.

The book describes the long and difficult process that led to the central banking model prevailing in most advanced economies at the end of last century. The critical institutional basis of that model is an independent central bank with price stability as its dominant objective. The book, which looks in particular at the Federal Reserve of the United States (Fed) and at the European Central Bank (ECB), also presents the essential components of that model, while noting that financial stability did not fit well in it and was the neglected child of central banks before the Great Recession. The book then illustrates the hits that the Great Recession delivered to that model and asks whether a radical rethinking of the model is necessary. In particular, it examines whether the renewed importance of the financial stability objective, the blurred borders between fiscal and monetary policies, the moral hazard created by the central bank’s forceful actions, and, finally, the actions of the ECB to protect the euro have jeopardized the pre-crisis central bank model. The answer to this question is that, while it is not possible to simply return to the pre-crisis central bank model, the adaptations that are needed are more incremental than radical when considered in a long historical perspective. They nevertheless require changes in the statutes of both the Fed and the ECB, and thus will have to overcome a high institutional hurdle.