The existing literature on optimal taxation typically assumes there exists a capacity to implement complex tax schemes, which is not necessarily the case for many developing countries. We examine the determinants of optimal redistributive policies in the context of a developing country that can only implement linear tax policies due to administrative reasons. Further, the reduction of poverty is typically the expressed goal of such countries, and this feature is also taken into account in our model. We derive the optimality conditions for linear income taxation, commodity taxation, and public provision of private and public goods for the poverty minimization case and compare the results to those derived under a general welfarist objective function. We also study the implications of informality on optimal redistributive policies for such countries. The exercise reveals non-trivial differences in optimal tax rules under the different assumptions. B Tuuli Paukkeri

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.Abstract: How does the public provision of education and the deployment of distortionary tax and subsidy instruments differ when the government's objective is conventional welfarist compared to when the objective is the non-welfarist one of equality of opportunity? This paper develops a framework in which the tax and provision rules in the two settings can be easily compared and contrasted. A range of results are derived which help to answer questions such as whether it is the case that progressive taxation is not used at all under opportunities-based objectives. We show that progressive taxation still plays a role in achieving the objective of equal opportunities, and illustrate how its use may differ under the two objectives. We also show how the provision of public education depends on how private education choices respond, especially the differential responses by higher-and lower-income families. These themes reflect concerns in the policy discourse, and our framework provides an entry point into a systematic exploration of a broad range of issues in comparing the consequences of welfarist and equality of opportunity objectives.

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