A nuclear regulator's paramount purpose is to utilize its expertise to ensure protection of public safety. But, recent actions by countries, such as Germany, to phase out nuclear power illustrate that public perception of nuclear safety can change swiftly despite a country's long history of safely operating nuclear power plants. Public trust, acceptance, and involvement in nuclear regulatory decisions, therefore, are critical to a successful nuclear power program. In the United States, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission ('NRC') has a long-standing practice of conducting its regulatory responsibilities in an open and transparent manner. The NRC, as a regular part of its decision-making process, also reaches out to affected and interested parties and invites their involvement in its regulatory processes. The NRC's efforts to instill public confidence are an explicit recognition that nuclear safety and security are the public's business. While the NRC must balance the public's rights to participate in the licensing process with the applicant's right to an efficient and timely licensing decision on an application, ultimately the NRC's decision-making process is more effective and more broadly accepted by the public when it includes participation of a diverse range of interested and affected parties.

Research examining regulatory independence has either suggested de jure independence to be a predictor of de facto independence or suggested that the presence of de jure may not always indicate de facto independence. We study the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) to emphasize how AERB has enjoyed de facto independence, even in the absence of de jure independence. Using “judicial deference” principle, and through a mapping of substantive court cases, the article demonstrates Indian judiciary has consistently applied deference to AERB’s decision-making process, thereby showing confidence in the nuclear regulatory regime sustained as its inception.

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