The ethic of care proposed by Carol Gilligan in late twentieth century instantly elicited a wide range of adaptations and elaborations in numerous disciplines, under the banner of ‘relational ethics’. Sally Gadow’s ‘relational narrative’ is one of these adaptations. Like Gilligan, Gadow aims to dismantle ethical rationalism or universalism, wherein the foregoing mainstream nursing practice had purportedly focused on applying existing philosophical theories of ethics to all conceivable clinical situations. For Gadow, every moral engagement, such as that between a nursing professional and a patient, comes with inherent unique features that render impotent any attempt at universalisation. Each clinical encounter is rather defined by the ability of the professional to engage the client in an intimate, caring relationship that enables healing to take place. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that the theory of Relational Narrative, particularly as  conceptualised and articulated by Sally Gadow, cannot be carried through without making some rationalist assumptions, because professionalism in nursing practice is by definition, a deeply embedded ingredient of rational reflection. Furthermore, nursing professionals can make progress or impact only by having recourse to the code of ethics; also, direct application of Gadow’s theory puts the nurse in a dilemma when it comes to dealing with patients suffering from chronic contagious diseases, such as the Ebola or the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Finally, juxtaposing Gadow’s work with the ideas of the earlier scholars she criticises unsparingly, the paper found that traces of universalist, rationalist assumptions abound in her thought precisely because of the wealth of influence she has garnered from philosophers and psychologists; influences going as far back as Descartes and Kant, down to Rawls and Kohlberg. The data used for this study came from library and archival materials, as well as from internet resources.

This paper is a hermeneutic exposition of the problem of illusion in sense perception, using the methods of critical and content analysis as tool of engagement. For decades, post-modern epistemology was steeped in the murky waters of the brilliant, sceptic argument from illusion, according to which the senses could not be relied upon for knowledge of the external world of reality, due to problems believed to be inherent in sensory perception. Why was the argument from illusion so important to epistemologists as to elicit enormous interest for such a long time? What are the implications of the argument for science? Did the argument from illusion portend any real danger for the foundations of empirical knowledge claims, as supposed by many frontline epistemologists? Exploring the concept and science of perceptual illusion, and the implications of the argument from illusion for science and epistemology, the paper found that the argument failed as a refutation of direct realism because it views illusion as the norm rather than an exception, and portrays human knowing process as an automatic, rather than a procedural, gradual phenomenon.

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This paper is a study of the problem of illusion in sense perception, using the methods of critical exposition and content analysis as tools of engagement. For decades, post-modern epistemology was steeped in the murky waters of the brilliant, skeptic argument from illusion, according to which the senses could not be relied upon for knowledge of the external world of reality, due to problems believed to be inherent in sensory perception. Why was the argument from illusion so important to epistemologists as to elicit enormous interest for such a long time? What are the implications of the argument for science? Did the argument from illusion portend any real danger for the foundations of empirical knowledge claims, as supposed by many frontline epistemologists? Exploring the concept and science of perceptual illusion, and the implications of the argument from illusion for science and epistemology, the paper found that the argument failed as a refutation of direct realism because it views illusion as the norm rather than an exception, and portrays human knowing process as an automatic, rather than a procedural, gradual phenomenon.

Digital technology has become an indispensable communication tool for students and educators in the past two decades. Currently, academic institutions view digital technologies as essential instructional content delivery media for both pedagogical and research purposes. This study assesses the extent of improvement of students’ learning through the use of Web 2.0 as an instructional tool in large classes using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). It juxtaposes this with the overall performance of students after the use of traditional lecture delivery method on some selected courses at the Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta (FUNAAB), Nigeria. These experiments were carried out at the end of the 2014/2015 academic session. Within this period, out of the selected courses, two courses (GNS 103 and GNS 204) were taught without the use of ICT technology while the others (HSM 207 and AAD 507) were taught using Web 2.0. The study revealed that there was a significant difference in the evaluation of the academic performance of the students taught with Web 2.0 technology, compared with those taught without it: 95.4% of the students taught with Web 2.0 technology in class were able to make evaluative comments and contributions to t