The Newly Liberalizing Countries (NLCs) in Eastern Europe have to undergo a fundamental structural change. In this paper the Chenery Hypothesis (CH) is employed to make a quantitative assessment of this change. The CH, roughly speaking, relates an economy's sectoral structure to its stage of development, its size, and its endowment with natural resources. The paper tests this hypothesis for a sample of 31 developed and developing economies and finds it still valid. Then it uses the results obtained to measure distortions in the NLCs' existing economic structure and to give a projection of future structural change. The calculations make it evident that the industrial sector in the NLCs will experience a marked downsizing whilst the service sector turns out to be too small. But sectoral patterns are not too uniform for all groups of countries. Thus, all projections depend highly on the reference group used to evaluate a 'master pattern'. Copyright 1996 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Summary This study asks whether the accuracy of macroeconomic forecasts for Germany has improved over time. We examine one‐year‐ahead forecasts of rates of real GDP growth and inflation for the years 1967–2010, by three major German forecasters and the OECD. We find that overall error levels are high but not much different from those of the U.S. and U.K. In the 1980s and 1990s accuracy improved somewhat, but has now returned to its 1970s level, indicating that it reflects the variance of growth and inflation. Benchmark comparisons with these predictions with ex post forecasts of a macroeconometric model indicate that accuracy can be improved, but it will be difficult to achieve.

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The Great Recession in Germany was noticed only seven months after its onset. This study examines whether the available data could have helped to predict or identify the crisis in real time. After assessing the accuracy of previous recession forecasts, we examine that of forecasts published from April to December 2008 by twelve major national and international forecast institutions and confront them with real-time data from official statistics, major surveys, and indicators. While annual forecasts for 2008 were unusually accurate due to errors of semi-annual forecasts offsetting each other, forecasters failed to observe the onset of the recession in Q2 2008, although from May onward an increasing amount of data indicated that the economy was in recession or was likely about to enter one. Though the data were neither ambiguous nor misleading, forecasters recognised the onset of the recession as late as mid-November, but also failed to warn of a coming recession. The most convincing explanations for these failures to recognize the crisis in time appear to have been the ‘truth effect’ and forecasters’ ‘low priors about the likelihood of a recession’.