For jurisprudence (doctrine and practice), the fundamental question of the principles of the nature of law is at the same time the question of the normative (special-legal) composition of law, the structure of its normative “substances" or a set of legal regulators. From the position of dominant views, legal regulators a priori recognize norms, or legal rules that are positive in legislation. This paradigm, which remains unshakable, is the basis of the assessment mechanism, the formed stable attitude to understanding the forms (sources) of law, the practice of making law enforcement decisions in situations of lack of legislation, as well as emerging defects in legal regulation, the need (validity) of the applicable norms. Rooted in Russian jurisprudence understanding of the principles of law as legal ideas” or more “general norms”, while the latter are not presumed as a legal basis for making individual legal decisions in resolving specific cases, is hopelessly outdated and does not correspond to the needs of developing practice. A paradigm change regarding understanding the structure and composition of regulators of law objectively requires a solution to an issue of fundamental importance, a kind of sui generis, the answer to which the pillars of philosophy and theory of law tried to answer (L.A. Hart, R.ºDvorkin, M. van Hook, R. Alexi, etc.): whether the law consists only of norms or are they a part of this whole; whether the norms of law are always perceived by law enforcement authorities, primarily by the courts, as the only legal basis, given that the norm to be applied is either absent, or differs in legal uncertainty, inconsistency, that is, is invalid.

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

In theoretical jurisprudence and legal practice the concept of “legitimate interests” to a large extent retains legal uncertainty. This concept has acquired categorical meaning in the conditions of domination in jurisprudence of positivism methodology, from the position of which only the fixation of rights in the legislation gives their bearers the legal possibility of their full-fledged realization and protection. Introduced into circulation by the representatives of legal positivism, the concept of “legitimate interests” also acquired a specific meaning: these are the interests that are subject to legal protection and defense, but not to the extent that is typical for interests, the satisfaction of which is associated with the provision of their bearer of subjective right. The value of this understanding turns out to be insignificant. In a broad, constitutional-legal sense, legally protected interests (not “legitimate interests”) are the same rights, but rights that have not “matured”, not legally formalized as a subjective right; it is also the legal form of the existence of an interest and the right corresponding to it. Over time and under the influence of certain factors, legal interests, as a result, of taking root in public practice or legislative registration, pass into the category of “full-fledged” rights. It is presumed that in the legal toolkit, “legal interests” perform (replace) the function of a special legal mechanism (tool) of protection of the part of socially acceptable interests that are not mediated in the form of subjective rights. From this point of view, it is more important for the legislator not to strive for all new interests to be relegated to the category of subjective rights, which is practically impossible to do (national law would then acquire an indefinite character with poorly expressed regulatory principles); it is more important to equip the constitutional system with effective mechanisms for the protection and defense of all social interests of any significance. This approach best meets the main constitutional clause — the recognition of the individual, his rights and freedoms as the highest value of society.