This paper investigates the impact of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on foreign direct investment (FDI) in transition countries. FDI stocks are characterised by sluggish adjustment and a dynamic pattern. This leads to biased estimates of the contemporaneous impact of BITs on FDI in static models. In our application, the contemporaneous (short-run) impact of BITs amounts to 4.8 per cent and the long-run effect to 8.9 per cent in the preferred model. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007 .

This paper develops a theoretical model of multinational firms with an internal capital market. Main reasons for the emergence of such a market are tax avoidance through debt shifting and the existence of institutional weaknesses and financial frictions across host countries. The model serves to derive hypotheses regarding the role of local versus foreign characteristics such as profit tax rates, lack of institutional quality, financial underdevelopment, and productivity for internal debt at the level of a given foreign affiliate. The paper assesses hypotheses in a panel data-set covering the universe of German multinational firms and their internal borrowing. Numerous novel insights are gained. For instance, the tax-sensitivity found in this paper is many times higher than previous research suggests. This accrues mainly to three things: the consideration of the boundedness of the internal debt ratio as a dependent variable in comparison to its treatment as an unbounded variable in most of the previous work; the coverage of all (small and large) multinationals here rather than a focus on large units in previous work; and the inclusion of endogenous characteristics in other countries multinationals are invested in (due to endogenous weights) while previous work did not consider such effects at all or assumed them to be exogenous. Moreover, local and foreign (at other locations of a given affiliate) market conditions matter more or less symmetrically and in the opposite direction. There is a nonlinear trade-off between institutional quality or financial development on the one hand and higher profit tax rates on the other hand, and the strength of this trade-off depends on the characteristics of one location relative to the other ones a multinational firm has affiliates (or the headquarters) in.

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Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are one of the few policy instruments that countries can use to directly attract foreign investment. Previous research has aimed at a quantification of the impact of BITs on foreign direct investment (FDI) at aggregated levels only. In contrast, in this paper, we deliver an anatomy of the effects of BITs on multinational activity at the micro level. We hope that this strategy will improve our understanding of the precise channels through which BITs determine aggregate investment. Using data on the foreign activity of the universe of German multinationals, we provide descriptive evidence on changes in the intensive and extensive margins of multinational firm activity around the adoption of BITs. The results of multivariate empirical models broadly support the hypotheses derived from a parsimonious model of heterogeneous firms on the effects of BITs on different margins of investment: BITs raise the number of multinational firms that are active in a particular host country and they have a positive effect on the number of plants per firm, as well as on FDI stocks and fixed assets per firm.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Until 2009, the United Kingdom operated a system of worldwide taxation. Taxation of foreign income was deferred until repatriated as dividends, leaving UK-owned multinational firms the possibility of avoiding UK taxation by delaying dividend payments and keeping earnings abroad. In 2009, the UK switched to a system under which all foreign-earned income is exempted from taxation. This fundamental change had a number of straightforward implications for UK-owned multinational firms and particularly changed incentives to repatriate profits. This paper assesses the effects of the reform on the foreign affiliates of UKowned multinational firms. We use data provided by Bureau van Dijk on 61,738 foreign affiliates located in one of 29 European countries to estimate the impact of the reform on the repatriation pattern and other outcomes of UK-owned affiliates. We use an identification approach that quasi-randomizes over the country of residence of the ultimate firm owners, allowing us to compare outcomes of treated UK-owned foreign affiliates to control non-UKowned foreign affiliates. Our results suggest that the switch to tax exemption not only changed dividend repatriation behavior of firms but also the conditions under which foreign entities operate in general, for instance, with regard to investment behavior. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: F230, H250.