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Since 2002 until now, the Iranian nuclear program remains one of the hottest international problems despite the efforts of three US presidential administrations, which ruled during this time to solve the Iranian issue. This article analyses and compares the policy toward Iran of three US presidents George Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, discusses the positive and negative consequences of their attempts to solve the Iranian nuclear issue, and outlines the future prospects of US-Iran communication over the nuclear deal. President Trump's policy on Iran was somewhat similar to that of President Bush, both presidents rejected the policy of any concessions to Iran and focused on the policy of pressure. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA influenced not only the relations between the US and Iran, but also the relations of European countries, as since its release in 2018, Europe has tried to save the JCPOA and deter Iran from resuming its nuclear program. In general, Trump's policies not only canceled the nuclear deal, which was the result of long negotiations by the Obama administration, but also complicated further negotiations with Iran. Despite the victory of Democrat Joe Biden, who is a follower of Obama's policies, signing a new agreement with Iran may be even more difficult than it was in 2013-2015, because Iran's missile program has become even more developed, as well as distrust of international treaties as well. The article analyzes the possible consequences of Trump's policies and options for returning to dialogue and agreement. The next crucial stage in Iran-US relations is the upcoming elections in Iran in 2021, the results of which will affect the readiness of any concessions to ease sanctions and establish a dialogue. Key words: Iranian nuclear program, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), economic sanctions.

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The article analyzes the US strategy in the nonproliferation field during three decades (in 1990s – 2018) and during the presidency of four US presidents (Bill Clinton, George Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump). The author considers the key guidelines of US nonproliferation strategy that are described in four Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) issued by each post-Cold War presidential administration. These documents describe the US nuclear policy in general, but the author focused on analysis of those their sections that were devoted to dealing with the risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The National Security Strategies of 1996 and 2002 were also analyzed in the article to clarify the nonproliferation aspects of US strategy that were not explained well in the published excerpts of the first two Nuclear Posture Reviews of presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush. As George Bush faced with the new challenges that required developing updated nonproliferation strategy like he terroristic acts on 11 September 2001, war in Iraq - the nonproliferation policy had to change too and focus more on preventing the terrorists from acquiring the nuclear bomb and nuclear materials. The last two NPRs of 2010 and 2018 were published fully and considered in the article as the primary source for understanding the nonproliferation policy of presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. All four post-Cold War presidential administrations faced with the new proliferation challenges, and the author examines how these new challenges were described in the US strategic documents and how the US nonproliferation strategy evolves. In addition, the article studies the practical implementation of the proclaimed nonproliferation strategies of four presidents and compares the efficiency of this implementation by each presidential administration. The author also assesses the consequences of realizing the US nonproliferation strategy for the international security and its influence of the future development of the global nonproliferation regime.

The article examines two antagonistic theories of international relations – neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism using the case of Iran's nuclear policy. The author compares the approaches of neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists to the problem of nuclear proliferation and analyzes how these approaches can explain the evolution of Iran's military nuclear program. Iran is a country with significant energy resources, namely second place after Saudi Arabia in terms of oil reserves and second in terms of natural gas reserves after Russia; Iran also has a unique geographical location in such regions as the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Also, a certain policy of Iran is formed on the basis of the Shiite branch of Islam, which already distinguishes this country, given the particularly unfavorable historical conditions under which the Shiite Islam was formed and the events of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, when Iran faced Iraq alone and use of chemical weapons by Iraq, which deepened Iranian isolation thoughts. The fact that there has been no international response to Iraq's use of chemical weapons has heightened Iran's sense of isolation. This experience was certainly imprinted in the Iranian national psyche and caused even greater distrust in international arms control treaties. Relations with the United States in Iran are extremely tense and unstable, depending on the US administration and the political situation in Iran, as Iran has traditionally maneuvered between radical conservatives and more moderate politicians. The US elections in 2020 and the elections in Iran in 2021 will be an important stage in the further development of relations and the fate of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The article examines the extent to which the theoretical considerations of proponents of theories of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are reflected in Iran's practical nuclear policy and what impact these two theories may have on the future nuclear strategy of the Iranian leadership.