In this note, the authors identify some problems concerning the introduction of mediation in Ukraine in terms of its use in the consideration and resolution of court cases. Despite the lack of clear legal regulation for mediation, courts in Ukraine still try to use this mechanism of pre-trial dispute resolution. Particular attention is paid to the law enforcement activities of courts in criminal and administrative cases, in which courts try to equate the conciliation procedure with the mediation procedure. These approaches clearly follow from the Resolutions and Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the settled case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) since, back in 1975, the ECtHR in its decision Golder v. The United Kingdom ruled that it is unlikely that the rule of law can be imagined without access to justice. However, the presumption that the courts are the main institution for resolving disputes continues to be undermined by the proliferation of alternative forms of dispute resolution, both agreement-based and judicial.

Human dignity has become a central legal concept throughout the world and is increasingly used in judicial decisions in many countries that do not include it in their national legislation. However, due to the acknowledged vagueness of the concept, academics and judges have identified many difficulties in its implementation and the specific challenges it poses to the rule of law. Consequently, from a documentary methodology this article tries to develop and propose, from the analysis of different philosophical approaches to the definition of human dignity, a series of principles that can be applied in judicial decisions to achieve a deep common understanding of the usefulness of human dignity and, at the same time, tries to solve problems that are now widely recognized, both by supporters and critics of the judicial use of this concept. It is concluded that the concept of human dignity must have a decisive influence on the formation, not only of substantive law but also of procedural law. It must become a criterion for the need for measures to prevent the abuse of procedural rights, the distortion of justice and the deliberate evasion of its main task.